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Abstract of
THE ROLE OF COMPULSORY SEALANES
IN RESOLVnrG r-roLTIPLE-USE CONFLICT
ON THE CONTINENTAL SHELF
An analysis of the nature of multiple-use conflict on the

.-

continental shelf developed with particular emphasis on the
involvement ot ocean transportation and offshore oil recovery.
The wide-ranging effects which offshore marine accidents may
have on coastal residents is discussed.

Trends indicate a

growth in the l.e'\/91 of conflict stemming from competition
between those wishing to use the same ocean space for the
same purpose, the same ocean space for different purposes,
and different but related ocean space for incompatible purposes.

Ocean transportation is identified as the single

common element in all three conflict categories.

It is the

most significant con i:"ibutor to dis-economies for third parties, as a result of offshore accidents.

Restriction on

traditional concepts of "freedom of the seas" is seen as the
only way to reverse current trends.

Compulsory vessel rout-

ing schemes, or "Sealanes," are proposed as the most promising
means of preventing accidents.

They are recommended both as

a measure to control vessel movements and as a means of preserving safe shipping routes which are free of man-made hazards.

Recent experience in Sealane usage is discussed and

some weaknesses pointed out.
ii
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PREFACE
1 have been convinced for some time that Grotian cona s are only applicable on a macro
cepts of freedom of the se
sca1e as regards the rights of nations to exploit the sea
the level of individual operaand its resources. Taken at
tors, Whether they be ship's masters or offshore oil companies,
it is nonsense to apply these concepts without significant
modification.

It is unreasonable to grant to the master of

a giant tanker-the unfettered right to sai1 it wherever and
whenever he sees fit.

The consequences of his mistakes can

be too far-reaching as was so amply proven in the Torrey
Canyon case.

The same h01ds true for offshore oil operators.

The world has readily accepted the imposition of stringent controls upon those who operate commercial aircraft.
I maintain that this is because the consequences of a mistake
are spectacular and have an obvious capability for involving
those who live on the ground below.

There is a parallel in

offshore marine operations, insofar as they affect those who
live in adjacent coastal areas.

I have attempted to show

that this is so and that present trends dictate a need for
strong action at the international level to regulate the
movement

of vessels and the emplacement of offshore struc-

tures, whether it be in territorial waters or on the high

111
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seas.

I have chosen compu1 so.. ~

schemes as the least

"Sealanes" or vessel routing

objectionable form of restriction on

marine operators.
One of the problems which I ran into in my research was
that of terminology.

The term "Sealanes" is commonly used

in the United States to designate a vessel routing scheme
which incorporates separation of opposing traffic streams
and safe routing through natural or man-made hazards.

A

"sea lane" is a lane or corridor within which all ship traffic moves in the same direction.

These terms are not inter-

nationally accepted, but, for reasons which I will explain,
I have chosen to use them.

International usage prefers the

terms "traffic separation scheme" and "traffic lane" to make
the same designations.
My

main problem in addressing my research was in deter-

mining how serious the problem really is and how effective
past efforts

hav~.been

multiple-use conflicts.

in reducing the consequences of

Most of the material which is con-

tained in the body of the thesis has been obtained by researching various newspapers and other types of factual
reports of marine accidents and public reaction to them.
Very little pas been written which views such accidents as
stemming from or contributing to multiple-use conflict.

I

have taken the liberty to infer that multiple-use conflict
is the root of the issue which must be addressed.
iv

Good factual information and statistical data have been
hard to come by.

I have been fortunate in gaining the assis-

tance of several individuals without whom I could never have
undertaken the effort.

I am grateful for the significant
-

help provided by Cdr. John M. Duke, of the Merchant Vessel

...

Inspection Division, U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, who provided much advice and background material on the development
of modern Sealanes in the United States.

I also received

valuable assistance from Rear Admiral G.S.Ritchie, Hydro-

.

grapher of the Royal Navy and President of the Institute of
Navigation; Mr. L. Goll, Head of the Navigation Section of
the Maritime Safety Committee of IMCO; Capt. A.C. Manson,
Head of the

~mrine

Division, United Kingdom Board of Trade;

Capts. R.N. Mayo and J .E. Bury of The Trinity House and
Honourable Company of Master Mariners; and Capt. I.F.
Sor.::merville and Mr. David Deacon of the Un1ted Kingdom
Chamber of Shipping; all of whom took time out from busy
schedules to provide me with unpublished information, of a
first-hand nature, on the involvement of their respective
organizations in the problem of shipping accidents and the
implementation of Sealanes to prevent them.

Special thanks

is also extended to Lloyd's of London, which allowed me free
access to its casualty statistics and report files.

v

TABLE OF

CONTl~NTS

PAGE

CHAPTER

ABSTRACT • • • • • • •
PREFACE • • • • • • •
LIST OF TABLES • • • •
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
I

II

INTRODUCTION

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • iii
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • viii

•• • • • • • • • • • • • • • ••

ix

•• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ••

1
1

Introduction • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ••
Backgound • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ••
Forms of Multiple-Use Conflict • • • • • • • ••
Use of the Same Space for the Same Purpose •••
Different Use of the Same Space • • • • • • • ••
The Use of Different Space for Different Purposes
Public Reaction • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ••
The Thesis • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ••

THE NEED FOR ACTION • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
The Common Element • • • • • • •
The Vessel Stranding Hazard • • •
Collisions Between Vessels •• •
Shipping and Offshore Structures
Trends ••• • • • • • • • • • •

• • •
• • •
• • •
•••
• • •

•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•

SltmmRry- • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Conclusions • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

III

CASE FOR MANDATORY SEALANES • • • • • •
Basic Approach to Conflict Resolution • •
Prevention of Ship-Ship Collisions • • •
Prevention of Stranding • • • • • • • • •
Prevention of Vessel-Structure Collisions
Mandatory Sealanes - The Logical Answer.

THE

vi

--

ii

•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•

••
••
••
••
••
••

2

5

6

6
8

10
11

13
13
14
21

30
37
40
41
42
42
42

44
45
47

PAGE

CHAPTER
IV

RECENT EXPERIENCE 'KITH SEALANES • • • • • • • • ••

The Involvement of IMCO • • • • • • •
The Question of Effectiveness • • • •
Problems of Non-Compliance • • • • •
The Problem of Encroachment • • • • •
Effectiveness of Sealanes in Reducing
Weaknesses in Present Schemes • • • •
Recent Actions of the United Kingdom
Sununary • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Conclusions • • • • • • • • • • • • •

• • • • ••
• • • • ••
• • • • ••
• • • • ._.
Accidents.
• • • • ••
• • • • ••
• • • • ••
• • • • ••

V PROBLEMS TO BE SOLVED • • • • • • • • • •
Introduction •• • • • • • • • • • • •
Pro~~em~ in Application • • • • • • • •
Problems in Enforcing Compliance • • •
Technological Problems of Envorcement •
The Next Law of the Sea Conference • •
NOTES

•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•

50
50

51
51

52
55
57

60

62
62

••
••
••
••
••
••

64
64
64
67

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

71

BIBLIOGRAPHY • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
APPENDIX I
SUMMARY OF VESSEL LOSSES DUE TO COLLISION.

69
69

84

STRANDING, AND CONTACT DAr-1AGE, 1956-1969

93

II

THE HISTORY OF SEALANES • • • • • • • • •

95

III

GLOSSARY

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

vii

131

LIST OF TABLES

PAGE

TABLE

.

I

Development of World International Seaborne
Trade, 1955-1968 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
•
J'.1axim'.m1 Projected ~'rorld Fleet Tonnage,
1970, 1975, and 1980 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Summary o~ Vessel Losses Due to Collision,
Stranding, and Contact Damage, 1956-1969 • • • • •
!l

II
III

viii

37
38
93

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
PAGE

FIGURE
Ships Totally Lost Due to Various Causes,
1955 through 1969 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ••

15

Tonnage Totally Lost Due to Various Causes,
1955 through 1969 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ...

16

Ships Over 500 Gross Tons Partially Lost Due
to Various Causes, 1955 through 1969 • • • • • • •

24

4.

Distribution of Collisions in the Dover Strait

• •

28

5.

Promis~ng-Offshore Oil

•••••••••••

34

6.

Oil Exploration Leases - East Coast of Canada • • •

35

7.

North Atlantic Track Routes • • • • • • • • • • • • 100
Lake Superior, Prescribed Ship Routes • • • • • • • 101

-.

2.

8.

10.

11.
12.

13.
14.
15.
16.

Areas

NEMEDRI Lanes in the Kattegat • • • • • • • • • • • 105
Collisions in the North Sea NEMEDRI Routes • • • • 107
Modification of Borkum-Terschelling NEMEDRI
Route to Provide Traffic Separation • • • • • • • • 109
Details of Shipping Safety Fairways,
Gulf of Mexico •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Shipping Safety Fairways, Gulf of Mexico • • • • •
Traffic Separation Scheme for Dover Strait • • • •
Sealane System, Port of New York • • • • • • • • •

115
117

121
123

Sealane and Shipping Safety Fairway System,
Santa Barbara Channel • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 125

1x

THE ROLE OF COMPULSORY SEALANES
IN RESOLVING MULTIPLE-USE CONFLICT
ON THE C01'."'TIN~NTAL SHELF

CHAPTER I
-.
INTRODUCTION

Introduction.

To the landsman, familiar with the traffic

congestion of freeways and city streets, the broad expanse
of the ocean must appear as a region free of competition for
space.

\then one considers that the sea comprises about 72%

of the earth's surface, and that at any given time it is
inhabited by less than one tenth of one percent of the world's
population, he would appear to be correct.

Nature, however,

has concentrated her ocean resources in a few relatively
small areas, generally on or over the continental shelves.
Man's activities on land have also been concentrated in a
relatively few locations, most of which border the sea.

His

sea lines of communication tend to converge at these locations resulting in high concentrations of shipping, frequently in busy offshore areas of resource exploitation.
As a result of popUlation growth and industrial development, offshore activities are increasing to the point where
congestion and competition for space is a growing source of
conflict.

The nature of the conflict may be political, as

the governments seek to assert their national claims to the
1

use of the sea and its resources; or it may be economic as
entrepreneurs seek to exploit the same'or competing resources.
The latter is normally referred to as multiple-use conflict.
This paper addresses multiple-use conflict, particularly
as it relates to the social impact of offshore marine accidents.

Recent experience has shown that the deleterious

effects of such accidents can be wide-ranging, affecting
the ecology and a broad spectrum of human activities in the
coastal areas of the world.

This has resulted in a growing

tendency on the part of coastal states to consider measures
to prevent, rather than to correct, these objectionable and
often costly results.

In doing so, they are likely to re-

strict the freedom of action of marine operators off their
"-

coasts, even on the high seas.

The shipping industry, being

the largest single user of the oceans, will be the prime
target for restrictive measures taken in the forseeable
future.
Background. . A brief resume of some typical offshore
accidents will serve to introduce the reader to the nature
of the growing use conflict and to the social impact which
it may have in coastal areas.

The broader aspects of the

problems which they typify will also be discussed.
On the morning of 18 March 1967, while proceeding on

a course determined by her master to be suitable in terms
2

.~

of least time track and ship safety, the 5.5. Torrey Canyon
ran aground off the southwest coast of England. 1 She was a
supertanker of 120,890 deadweight tons capacity and one of

-.

the world's largest ships.

As a result of her misfortune,

she ultimately released some 117,000 tons (36,000,000 gallons)
of crude oil into the sea. 2 The ensuing large-scale efforts
to prevent or remedy serious ecological damage to the coasts
of England and France vividly demonstrated that the consequence~

of major offshore accidents may deeply involve parties

other than the ship's owner, its crew, and its master.

In

May of 1967, referring to the extensive havoc caused by the
Torrey Canyon's grounding, Prime Minister Harold Wilson of
the United Kingdom stated that his government was considering
any action which lay within its control to prevent a recurrence of the episode.' He raised the possibility of controlling the routes taken by giant tankers and other ships
carrying dangerous cargo, without waiting for international
agreement.

He stated, "The old concept of territorial waters

is not enough."

A Government White Paper proposed that the

law of the sea, regarding shipping on the high seas, was
" • • • quite out of date.,,4
Early on the morning of 18 January 1971, the 17,000 ton
tanker, Arizona Standard, proceeding into San Francisco Bay,
collided with her sister ship, Oregon Standard, which was
outbound with a cargo of burUter oil.

,

As a result, some

..,

840,000 gallons of oil were released into the bay and along
the Pacific coast. 5 It took the efforts of government
agencies, workmen from Standard Oil Company, and thousands
of citizen volunteers to minimize the consequences of the
accident, which are not yet fully known.

The impending

collision was observed by a helpless operator at an experimental Harbor Advisory Radar installation, operated by the
United States Coast Guard in San Francisco Bay.

Had both

vessels been required to maintain radio communications with
the radar operator, and had he the authority to direct their
movements, it is unlikely that the accident would ever have
occurredo 6 Once again, an accident resulted fr()m errors in
judgement on the part of experienced seamen exercising their
traditional rights to proceed without externally imposed
controls.

Once again, parties not directly involved in the

process which led to the catastrophe were required to exert
a major effort to protect the public good.
During the period from 1 July 1962 to 30 June 1965, an
average of three collisions per year occurred between seagoing vessels and offshore oil structures in the Gulf of .
Mexico, many of them in international waters. 7 In one such
collision, the vessel backed away from the oil platform
carrying burning oil tanks which had been deposited on her
foredeck. 8 All of the elements needed for a major marine
disaster were present.

In another instance, a large
4

'-

sea-going vessel struck and virtually destroyed an unmanned
offshore oil platform, toppling it into the sea and releasing
large quantities of oi1. 9 The danger to mariners and platform crews from such occurrences is obvious, but it is the
well publicized Santa Barbara 011 spill of 1969 which more
nearly typifies the consequences to coastal residents.

As

a result of this oil well blow-out, between one and three
million gallons of oil were spilled into the sea, causing
extensive pollution of the adjoining coastal area. 10 While
this particular accident was not the result of a collision
between a vessel and an offshore oil rig, it bears witness
to the degree of third party involvement which

~ght

result

should such an accident occur.
Forms of Multiple-Use Conflict.

Each of the incidents

described abQve is an example of the growing problem of
multiple-use conflict in the coastal areas of the world.
They represent forms which specifically involve ocean transportation and which represent conflicts with a maximum
potential for creating disaster or dis-economies for third
parties.
Griffin11 and Clingan12 have categorized such multipleuse conflicts into three major groupings:
Transitory use of the seme ocean space for the
same purpose.

5

Use of the same ocean space for different
purposes.
Use of different but related ocean space for
different and obnoxious purposes.
",

Use of the Same Space for the Same Purpose.

Competition

for transitory use of the same space for the sarne purpose
primarily involves ocean transportation, and, to a lesser
extent, such activities as commercial fishing and recreational
boating.

At its worst, it results in collisions between

major sea-going vessels such as that between the Arizona
Standard and Oregon Standard.

As a minimum, it leads to

uncerta:hlty, inconvenience, and lost time enroute.

Despite

the existence of internationally accepted Rules 'of the
Nautical Road, implementation of voluntary traffic separation
schemes and technological advances such as radar, collision
at sea occurs at an alarming rate.

It constitutes the lead-

ing class of maritime casualty.1 3
Different Uses of the Same Space.

Conflicts between

different users of the same ocean space most frequently
involve ocean transportation, offshore oil recovery, and
commercial fishing.

To a lesser extent, they also include

recreation, scientific research and military operations.

A

typical example ,is presented in the Gulf of Mexico where
thousands of oil recovery platforms exist in open waters.

-

Of these, almost 2,000 exist in water which is navigable by
6

deep draft vessels. 14

They, therefore, constitute an impedi-

ment to navigation and a hazard to ocean transportation.
The conflicts resulting from offshore oil activities

-.

also exist in the Santa Barbara Channel off the coast of
California.

They are expected to extend to George's Bank,

off the coast of New England, and to the fishing grounds off
Canada's Maritime Provinces.

Exploration leases have already

been let and exploratory drilling has started in the latter
area. 15 Active offshore drilling has been underway in the
North Sea for some time.
Another example of this type of conflict has existed
for years in offshore regions such as George's

~ank

and the

Grand Banks of Newfoundland.

It involves both ocean transportation and commercial fisheries. 16 The accepted North

Atlantic track routes should normally take trans-oceanic
traffic south. of the banks* , however, the opening of the
St. Lawrence Seaway in 1959 has increased the level of large
ship traffic through the fishing grounds.

Another compli-

cating factor has been the growing tendency of ship operators

*This conflict has been internationally recognized
for some time. Safety of Life at Sea Convention, 17 June
1960 (16 U.S.T. 185, T.I.A.B. 5780.) Chapter V, reg. 8
provides rr(c) The Contracting Governments • • • will also
induce owners of all ships crossing the Atlantic to or
from parts of the United States or Canada via the vicinity
of the Grand Banks of Newfoundland to avoid, as far as
practicable, the fishing banks of Newfoundland north of
latitude 43° N. during the fishing season, • • • • "
7

to employ weather routing in preference to the track routes. 17
Any North Atlantic sailor who has dodged trawlers on the banks
off Canada and New England 1s well aware of the danger and
".

confusion which exists there, particularly in poor visibility
which is so common.
The Use of Different Space for Different Purposes.

The

use of different ocean space for different and obnoxious
purposes normally involves polluting or otherwise rendering
adjacent ocean space or the seabed unfit for other desired
activities.

Several activities such as dredging, offshore

mining, and waste disposal are factors in this class of
conflict, but it is oil which is the subject of'growing and
often emotional concern throughout the world.

The harmful

consequences of oil pollution extend to practically all
activities both in the vicinity of the land-sea interface
and further offshore.
The furor resulting from the Banta Barbara oil spill in
1969 stimulated executive action at the highest levels in

the federal government. 18

The detrimental effects of off-

shore oil operations on fisheries in the Gulf of Mexico
have long concerned conservationists there.

The New England

Fisheries and Conservation Committee, expecting an expansion
of offshore oil'recovery into the region of Georgets Bank,
has raised the question of possible harm to fisheries
a major oil well blowout occur. 19
8

~hould

It is not offshore oil production, however, which is
the prime contributor to the world-wide problem of oil
tion.

pollu~

The ocean transportation industry has been the prime

source of oil pollutants along the coastlines of the world
for years. 20 The problem is growing despite the existence
of international conventions and controls which have been
unilaterally imposed by coastal states.*

It is estimated

that one tenth of one percent of the volume of oil transported by sea is discharged into it as a pollutant. 22 A
paper presented to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) in November 1970 stated that at least one million
tons of oil were released into the sea annually as a result
of strandings, collisions, and other shipping

1~sses.23

Routine oil spillage resulting from deballasting and tank
cleaning is estimated in the President's Report on Oil Pollution to have reached a potential annual average of 100,000
tons. 24 Massive oil spills, resulting from strandings like
those of the Torrey Canyon, Ocean Eagle, Arrow, and

~

*Typical examples of unilateral actions by coastal
states are the "Oil Pollution Act, 1924," (33 USC 431-437)
and Canada's Bill C-202, Arct~l Water Pollution Prevention
Bill, enacted in August 1970.
International conventions
dealing with oil pollution include the 1954 International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by
Oil (12 UST 1523, TIAS 4 900,600 liNTS 205) Article 24 of
which provides a basis for pollution control within the
contiguous zone by authorizing a coastal state to regulate
activities therein to prevent inf'ringement of its "sanitary regulations. tl
9

Gettysburg, and collisions such as that between the Arizona
Standard and the Oregon Standard, are the major causes of
public concern. * The rapid onslaught of pollution resulting
from such incidents is devastating and requires huge expenditures of time, manpower, and money to mitigate the results.
Public Reaction.

The Torrey Canyon incident truly

awakened the world to the consequences of massive oil spills
immediately offshore.

Perhaps the attention which her mis-

fortune has focused on the problem has resulted in a distorted public impression that the frequency of such incidents
is growing.
~or

It cannot be denied, however, that the elements

increased risk and level of danger are present.

Modern

industry demands increasing amounts of hazardous or obnoxious
bulk materials to

~eed

it.

For the foreseeable future the

major share of these materials will be carried by sea.

At

present one out of five vessels is engaged in transporting
petroleum products or other dangerous cargo. 25 In 1968,
1120 million metric tons of oil were carried by sea, amounting to 55%, by volume, o~ all ocean cargo. 26

*Each of these incidents resulted in rapid release
oil in the Vicinity of populated coastal areas.
Estimated spills amounted to Torrey can!on, 18 March
1967, 36,000,000 gallons; Ocean Eagle,
March 1968,
3,000,000 gallons; Arrow, 4 February 1970, 3,800,000
gallons; Esso Gettysburg, 21 January 1971, 386,000
gallons; and Oregon Standard, 18 January 1971, 840,000
gallons.
o~

10

In a speech before the New York Oil Pollution Conference
in December 1969, Under-Secretary of the Interior Russel E.

Train, in discussing the growing threat, stated that our
increasing energy requirements would force us to go to more
remote areas, including deeper offshore waters, to meet our
needs.

Referring to the difficulty in cleaning up spilled

oil, he stated that society" ••• must determine what level
of risk is acceptable
tive" action. 27
The Thesis.

••• n

and take appropriate "preven-

The key word in Under-Secretary Train's

speech is "preventive."

Multiple-use conflict will not

disappear of its own accord.

Also, it is clear that the

problem is international in nature and will, therefore, require international cooperation for its solution.

What is

not so clear-is that an effective solution, which prevents
rather than corrects the consequences, is very likely to
challenge many aspects of the traditional and inter-nationally agreed upon concepts of freedom of the seas.
It is the position of the author that the well-being
of those who inhabit the margins of the world's oceans supercedes these traditional concepts as they are currently
exercised by individual operators.

The prerogative of the

master to sail his ship wherever and whenever he sees fit,
or for an offshore oil operator to erect a structure without
11

regard for other users, should be reviewed and reassessed
in the context of the times.

There is no intent to challenge

the rights of nations to use the world ocean.

Within the

limits of agreed-upon conventions, transportation, exploitation of resources, science, defense, and other legal uses
should remain unimpaired.

It is, however, only reasonable

that coastal states should be afforded the means to protect
their citizens and resources from the depredations of disinterested non-nationals.

If they are unable to do so through

international machinery, they are likely to do so on a unilateral basis.
It is in the best interests of the maritime nations and
the shipping industry to implement a truly effective solution
to the problem of offshore collisions and strandings.

Nations

which have large numbers of offshore oil structures are well
advised to take action at an early stage to limit the degree
of conflict between shipping and oil recovery operations.
The most logical approach to address the broadest spectrum
of conflicts is a system of compulsory vessel routing schemes,
or "Sealanes," which are protected from encroachment by
users of ocean space.

o~her

Admittedly this will be restrictive

to both forms of activities, however, if properly managed
it need not cost either unduly.

12

CHAPTER II

THE NEED FOR ACTION
The Common Element.

Obviously ocean transportation is

the major common element in all three conflict categories.
In the first two categories, ship-ship collisions and shipstructure collisions lead to direct losses for those who own
the vessels, the cargoes or offshore structures.

They may

also lead to significant loss of life for those on board.
Vessel strandings and deballasting operations are the main
factors in the third conflict category, that of obnoxious
use of different ocean space.

Whenever vessel collisions

result in large-scale releases of obnoxious or hazardous
materials, the first two categories overlap into the third.
Economically speaking, ocean transportation is the most
productive user of ocean space. 1 It is, therefore, reasonable and proper to ask whether it is really necessary to take
some form of restrictive action to reduce the incidence of
accidents involVing shipping.

How many collisions or strand-

ings occur? What are the trends? Will the problem resolve
itself without action on the part of the maritime community?
In order to answer these questions, it is worthwhile
to examine the situation which currently exists, the trends,
and the actions which have already been taken to. address the
problem.
~.

Figures 1 and 2 are plots of vessels totally lost,
13

in terms of tonnage and individual ships, from 1955 through
1969. 2 Partial losses due to various causes are plotted in
Figure 3 for the same period. 3
The Vessel Stranding Hazard.

Stranding has been a major

category of marine casualty since the days when man first
put to sea.

The first seamen truly sailed into the unknown.

Lacking charts, timepiece, or compass, they were in no position to know where they were let alone what dangers existed
beneath the surface of the sea.

Much of the romance which

is presently associated with the mariners of old can be
attributed to the danger and uncertainty which they faced,
and rightly so, for many never returned as their small
vessels stranded or foundered off strange shores.
Things began to develop rapidly with the dawning of the
age of discovery in the fifteenth century.

As man girdled

the globe and came to covet the exotic products of distant
lands, the volume of seaborne trade steadily increased.

The

loss of ships due to stranding was intolerable and the headlands, rocks and shoals in the Vicinity of the world's busy
ports became veritable graveyards for ships.

Prior to the

advent of the steamship, the maritime community devoted the
major part of its safety efforts to minimizing this costly
danger.

Some of the more obvious efforts included better

charting, more accurate position fixing, and aids to
tion to warn mariners away from unknown hazards.
14
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Efforts to reduce strandings continued without letup
into the steamship era.

Better charts, extensive buoyage,

and all-weather electronic aids such as radio beacons, LORAN
and DECCA were implemented.

Yet, despite the best efforts

of modern man, stranding continues to be a major problem,
not only for those who operate ships, but also for those
who inhabit the coastlines adjacent to busy shipping routes.
Figures 1 and 2 clearly show that stranding is the most
significant cause of total loss of vessels.

In terms of par-

,

tial damage to vessels over 500 gross tons it ranks third,
following collisions and contact damage. * There was a clear
upward trend in losses due to stranding until 1967 at which
time a reversal occurred; hopefully, a permanent one.

The

reason for the reversal is not fully clear, however, it may
be more than just a coincidence that commencing in June of
that year the first in a worldwide series of vessel routing
schemes was implemented in the Strait of Dover. 5
A vessel may become stranded due to an "act of God,"
improper charting of navigational hazards, or a variety of
other reasons beyond the control of her master.

In the

majority of cases, however, errors in judgement on the part

*Contact damage falls short of total loss of a vessel.
It is a term used by the Liverpool Underwriters to designate damage resulting from a vessel striking objects such
as piers, submerged ~ecks, rocks, and offshore structures,
to mention but a few.
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of ship's personnel are the cause.

A review of statistics

compiled by the U.S. Coast Guard reveals that in the period
from 1 July 1969 to 30 June 1970 personnel fault was the
primary cause of 329 of 531 groundings for which cause was
determined.

Of the vessels involved, 48 were tankers and

122 were of over 10,000 gross tons displacement.

Most of

the groundings occurred in U.S. inland waters, however, a
surprising ?1 occurred on the open seas off the coast. 6
The most significant concern of coastal states, with
regard to stranding, other than loss of life, is the threat
of massive pollution of their coastlines.

The Torrey Canyon

incident, which has been previously discussed, focused the
attention of coastal states on the degree of possible damage

.~

to the coastal environment and the cost to correct it.?

The

reaction which this monster spill evoked in the British
government was duplicated elsewhere.

South Africa proposed

legislation in 1968 which would have denied the right of
innocent passage for tankers within 12 miles of its coast.
Since the Summer Loadline Zone comes to within 13 miles at
some points off the coast, vessels complying with the International Loadline Convention of 1966 would have been fure1eled
through a corridor no more than one mile Wide as they rounded
the southern tip of Africa.

The International Chamber of

Shipping (reS) called this potentially dangerous situation
to the attention of the government which amended its .
18

legislation.

With the cooperation of the ICS, the govern-

ment developed a vessel routing scheme which includes traffic
separation and which, in some places, comes within 12 miles
of the coast. 8
In the case of South Africa, the threat of prohibitive
legislation caused the shipping industry not only to accept
rigid vessel routing, but to propose it.

This departure

from a traditional position of resisting all efforts to curb
the freedom of the ship's master to sail his vessel wherever
and however he chooses may become increasingly necessary.

Canada's Bill C-202, Arctic Waters Pollution Act, represents
another unilateral action on the part of a coastal state to
protect its coastal environment by regulating vessel movements on the high seas. 9 By enacting this legislation in
August 1970 Canada extended its authority to impose regulations on foreign shipping out to a distance of 100 miles
from her coast, north of the sixtieth parallel.

Bill C-202

was enacted over the protest of the United States, which
characterized it as a unilateral infringement on the freedom
of the seas which would restrict merchant Shipping.10 The
Canadian government has responded by claiming that present
international law is not adequate to protect coastal states
from damage due.to oil pollution.

It proposes to develop
new concepts to correct the deficiencies. 11
19

The United States, which objected so promptly to Canada's
action in passing the Arctic Waters Pollution Act, has within
its own Executive Branch elements which would impose controls
on vessels on the high seas.

In its first report, the Presi-

dent's Panel on Oil Spills pointed to the inability of a
sovereign state, under international law, to control the
movements of a vessel which constitutes a pollution threat
to its coastal areas, until it is within the Contiguous Zone.
Accordingly, the panel recommended that:
Further study be made on designation of
sea lanes for control of tanker routing and
that steps be taken to develop and implement
a U.S. plan for avoidance of hazardous or unique
areas by tankers carrying oil and other hazardous
substances. Every effort should be made to make
use of designated sea lanes mandatory rather than
at the option of the tanker Captain. 12
There is, implicit in the foregoing statements and
government actions, a strategic warning to ship operators
and major shipping nations.

Unless they, in cooperation

with international bodies such as the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), take the lead in
developing acceptable and effective measures to prevent
massive oil spills, coastal states will take unilateral
action to restrict their freedom of movement, even on the
high sea.

There is a strong possibility that such actions

could result in large dis-economies for the industry.

20

Collisions Between Vessels.

Strandings have been shown

to be the most significant cause of total loss of vessels
and massive oil spills.

When considered on an overall basis,

however, collisions are the most common cause of ship casualty.
Prior to the advent of the steamship, collision between
seagoing vessels was a rare occurrence.

Sailing vessels,

by the nature of their means of locomotion, were hardly
likely to encounter one another head to head, a situation
which has been proven by experts to be the most conducive
to collisions at sea. 13 Within a short time after its
arrival, the steamship had injected a new and significant
dimension into the problem of safe navigation.

Freed of

the need to conform to weather patterns, those who navigated
mechanically propelled vessels took the most direct routes
between ports of origin and destination.

Making accurate

use of the growing system of aids to naVigation, both as
landfalls and points of departure, opposing streams of traffic tended to concentrate at specific locations at the
approaches to major ports.

The collision rate took a preci-

pitous upward turn resulting in many spectacular accidents
toward the end of the nineteenth century.

As collisions

continued to grow in frequency and cost, the maritime community began to develop a system of procedures and. ship construction standards to reduce both the occurrence and
consequences.

21

On an international basis, the first steps taken to

curb the collision danger were done at the urging of the
President of the United States.

In Washington, in 1889,

the Conference of all Maritime Nations codified the Inter. national Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea. 14
Subsequent Safety of Life at Sea (SaLAS) conferences were
held in London in 1913, 1928, 1948, and 1960, all of which
have addressed the collision problem, among other things.
At the present time the primary international forum for
matters concerning the safety of life at sea is the Maritime
Safety Committee (MSC) of the Inter-governmental Maritime
Consultative Organization (IMCO).

Since its formation in

1959, as a result of ratification of the 1948 Geneva Convention, IMCO has grown in stature and effectiveness in most
matters relating to international shipping.

The collision

problem has a high place on its list of priorities.
In addition to the procedural and regulatory remedies
which he has sought, man has applied his developing technology to the problem of preventing collisions.

With the

introduction of radar, it was felt that a large percentage
of collisions which are attributed to poor visibility could
be substantially reduced.

-.

This hope is far from being real-

ized; indeed, some studies have pointed to just the opposite
result which has led to the coining of the term,· "radar
assisted collision."15
22

Despite all of the activities described above, and
many more which are too numerous to mention, man has been
unable to reduce the long term upward trend in collision
statistics.

From Figure 3 it can be seen that this type of

casualty involves the greatest number of ships of all categories of marine accidents.

It is the most frequent and

costly form of multiple-use conflict on the world's oceans.
The statistics of the Liverpool Underwriters * show that
over the period from 1956 to 1969, 33% of the world merchant
fleet, of vessels over 500 gross tons, suffered partial
losses as a result of Borne form of marine accident.

Over

the same period,

20.6~

in a collision.

Commencing in 1965, the percentage of the

of all vessels damaged were involved

world fleet involved in accidents began to decline; however,
it is disturbing to note that the percentage of damage
resulting from collision has increased slightly.

A simple

mathematical calculation shows that, in the long term, somewhere between six and seven percent of the total world fleet
can be expected to be involved in a collision.

In light of

the present growth trends, in size and number of merchant
vessels, this is not a very comforting thought.
The concern expressed above is borne out by the fact
that in 1969 collisions resulted in the partial or total

*See

Appendix I.
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FIGURE 3
SHIPS OVER 500 GROSS TONS PART rALLY LOST
DUE TO VARIOUS CAUSES, 1955 THROUGH 1969
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t,

loss of 1,669 vessels of over 500 gross tons. 16

This is a

decrease from the post-World War II peak of 1,970 casualties,
which occurred in 1965, and speaks well for the measures
which the maritime community and IMCO have taken to improve
maritime safety.

Unfortunately, in terms of tonnage and

ships totally destroyed, it was the worst year on record,
doubling the figure of 1968. 17 Incomplete returns for 1970
indicate a significant reduction, at least in terms of partial losses, however, collisions still acounted for 20.6%
of all damage suffered, right on the 15 year average. 18
Collisions, to a much greater extent than strandings,
are primarily a result of personnel error.

Statistics pub-

lished by the U.S. Coast Guard for the period 1 July 1969
to 30 June 1970 show that 232 reporting vessels experienced
casualties as a result of collisions.

A total of 735 vessels

were involved, of which 18 were tankers and 38 displaced over
10,000 gross tons. * Considering that it takes at least two
ships to create a collision, it can be seen that the maximum
possible number of collisions in the set is 367.

Personnel

fault was assessed as the primary cause in 306 or 8496 of the

*The figures which are quoted here are based on the
sums of two separate collision categories which the Coast
Guard has titled "Collisions; crossing, meeting and
over-taking" and "Collisbn, fog." For the purposes of
this discussion, it makes no difference whether visibility
was good or poor; it is the consequences which are important.
25

cases. 19

There is no reason to doubt thatthis assessment

of cause should be extrapolated on a world-wide basis.
states which experience a large volume of ship traffic
in the proximity of their coasts are becoming increasingly
alarmed at the high incidence of collisions.

Although mas-

sive oil spills from collisions such as that resulting from

the Arizona Standard/Oregon Standard incident are rare,
there is a high potential risk of such an occurrence.

A

recent sequence of accidents in the Dover Strait has aroused
grave public concern in the United Kingdom.

As a result of

a collision with the Peruvian freighter, Paracas, on 11
January 1971, the unladen Liberian
broke in two and sank.

tanke~Texaco

Caribbean,

FollOWing this initial incident, two

additional vessels, the Brandenburg and the Nikki, struck
the submerged wreckage and were also sunk.

In all, 53 per-

sons lost their lives within a three week period.

Had the

18,000 dwt Texaco Caribbean been fully laden, serious pollution would also have resulted. 20 This unfortunate series
of accidents has aroused strong sentiments in the British
Parliament to compel vessels transiting the English Channel
to comply with the routing schemes which presently exist
there regardless of their nationality.21
Admittedly,_ the Dover Strait is a special case, both in
term~

of geography and traffic density.

In fact, the entire
.
marine region of northwestern Europe from the Dover Strait

26

past the Hook of Holland to the entrance of the Kiel Canal
supports the greatest volume of seaborne traffic anywhere
in the world.

It has been shown that close to 60% of all

collisions occur in those waters, of which 5% of the total
occur on the open sea. 22 Figure 4 shows the distribution
of collisions which occurred in the Strait in the three year
period between 1 January 1967 and 31 January 1971.

The con-

centration on the English side is noteworthy.
A review of casualty statistics assembled by the U.S.
Coast Guard and the Liverpool Underwriters shows that collision is no stranger to the waters adjacent to the United
States. 33 Approximately 15% of the world's total occur in
these waters; of which number some 15% occur in the open sea.
Comparison of these figures with those of northwestern Europe
shows that, of the total number of collisions occurring in
each area, the proportion of those which occur on the open
sea is three times greater in American waters.

Several

spectacular collisions, many of which have involved large
passenger liners, have occurred on the high seas approaches
to New York.

Fortunately, in recent history none has resulted

in the huge loss of life that was potential in the situation,
even though one ship or the other was totally destroyed.

In

two fairly recent cases, the danger was heightened considerably

27

FIGURE

DISTRIB~ION

4-

OF COLLJ;.SIONS IN THE DOVER

STRAIT

Source: J.H. Beattie, "Collisions in ~he Dover Strait."
Presented to a Meeting of the Institute of Navigation, (London:
3 February 1971), oiting Lloyd's Casualty Statistics.

28

as a result of one of the vessels being a tanker.*
British maritime safety officials have expressed a
belief that it may be necessary to impose positive traffic
control on vessels transiting the Dover Strait. 25 In as
much as there exists no precedent for implementing such a
scheme in international waters, the thought raises the possibility of Britain and France extending the limits of their
territorial seas to 12 miles and terminating the high seas
status of this busiest of all international waterways.

Un-

less the collision rate, which now averages one per month,26
1s significantly reduced, public reaction may force these
governments into taking such action.
Once again, as in the case of public reaction to strand1ngs, the ocean transportation industry is running the risk
of navigation restrictions as a result of unilateral government action.

This possibility is also implicit in the

"Declaration of Latin American States on the Law of the Sea,"
in Lima, 8 August 1970.

The perception of a threat can be

a highly subjective judgement on the part of the coastal
state.

Maritime operators should need little incentive to

take whatever measures are necessary to permanently reverse
*Some of the more spectacular collisions which involved
passenger liners were those between the liners Stockholm
and Andria Doria, July 1956; liner Santa Rosa and tanker
Valchem, March 1959; aRd liner Shalom and tanker· stolt
Bagii, November 1964. 2
29
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the unacceptable long-term trend in collision statistics.
After all, it is they who are the biggest long-term losers.
Shipping and Offshore Structures.

Statistically speak-

ing, the problem of vessel collisions with offshore oil
structures 'is a minor one compared to stranding and shipship collisions.

Geographically speaking, only the Gulf of

Mexico presents a problem of significant concern to maritime
safety officials and ship operators.

Nevertheless, the

.
Coast Guard, American
Institute of Merchant Shipping (AIMS) * ,
and shipping underwriters have branded offshore oil structures as navigation hazards. 27
Coast Guard statistics show an average of about three
collisions per year between ships and offshore structures
in the Gulf of Mexico.

Figures are based only upon reported

accidents which means that those involving foreign vessels
28
beyond the limit of the territorial sea are not- included.
It is difficult to say how many accidents such as that which
involved the Greek Freighter, Olympic Flame, on 19 October
29
1970 would add to the overall statisticS.
Considering
that over 300 deep draft ships operate daily out of Gulf
ports and that over 75% of them are foreign, one can only
conclude that the Coast Guard statistics are conservative.
*Formerly the American Merchant Marine Institute (AMMI).
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Oil recovery operations first moved off shore in 1947
in the Gulf of Mexico.

At first they presented no problem

to the mariner; in fact, oil structures were welcomed by
local seamen as a form of aid to navigation.

Technology

limited them to shallow water and they were, therefore, no
threat to large ocean-going vessels.
short-lived for several reasons.

The honeymoon was

The principle ones were

the push into deeper water, which improving technology permitted, and the appearance of mobile platforms which are
used for exploratory drilling.

Stationary platforms permit-

ted the mariner to familiarize himself with the hazards in
a particular area.

The mobile platform was a will-o-the-

wisp, disappearing from one spot and appearing in another
between the departure and return of a ship on a single

voy~ge.30 They were particularly bothersome to foreign
vessels which, more often than not, lacked appropriate
Notices to Mariners and up-tO-date navigation charts.
With the passage of the Submerged Lands Act31 and the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act32 in 1953, the push into
deeper water was accelerated.

Federal jurisdiction, which

had previously been somewhat uncertain, was extended to all
structures or "artificial islands" on the continental shelf
for the purpose of navigational safety.

The U.S. Army Corps

of Engineers was empowered to restrict the erection of structures which 'jould constitute a navigational hazard.
31
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The

u.s.

Coast Guard was given the authority to prescribe its

"Rules and Regulations for Artificial Islands and Fixed
Structures on the Outer Continental Shelf," by which it
prescribes light and sound signals to be carried to warn
Shipping.34

The Corps of Engineers, after discussions with

concerned interests, established structure-free lanes or
"fairways" at the approaches to major Gulf ports in order
to provide safe access for shipping.

Despite the legisla-

tion and actiVities of government agencies, Gulf shippers
find themselves, today, in a position where coastwise shipping must make wide deviations to seaward to avoid the
hazards of offshore structures. *
Setting aside the ship-structure collision, which is
only regionally significant at the present time, one should
be able to look at the broader problem in its developing
perspective.

At its root is encroachment, by offshore

reso~ce exploiters, on large navigable areas of the sea

so as to make them unusable or hazardous for shipping.

If

uncontrolled, the process creates a condition whereby vessels
must maneuver deviously to approach a port or round a headland.

As a minimum, this results in lost time and significant

dis-economies for ship operators over the long term.

Given

heavy ship traf~ic and frequent poor visibility, the results
*See the discussion in AppendiX II.
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are as likely to be sunk or damaged ships and oil rigs.

As

pointed out in Chapter I, this raises a considerable threat
of coastal pollution due to large oil spills from damaged
ships or oil platforms.
The growth rate of these structures creates the greatest
alarm in shipping circles.

Over the period from 1961 to

1969, the rate at which new wells were completed off the
U.S. coast increased from a little over 500 to over 1200
per year.

At the present time there are over 8000 oil plat-

forms in the Gulf of Mexico alone and over 16,000 estimated
world-wide. 35 Producing wells exist out to nearly 100 miles
from shore in up to 340 feet of water. 36

The pace is in-

creasing allover the globe and is expected to continue as
the world's energy demands deplete onshore resources.

Figure

5 identifies some of the most promising offshore oil areas.
Based on existing shipping patterns, one might predict conflict in the North Sea, Gulf of Mexico, East China Sea,
Indonesia, and the Gulf of St. Lawrence, as well as off the
coasts of the southwestern United States, South Africa,
eastern Canada, and the northeastern United States.

The

potential magnitude and complexity of the problem can be
seen by referring to Figure 6, which is a map of oil exploration leases which have been granted off eastern Canada.
Should these prove to be fruitful deposits, they. will bring
shipping, oil, and fishing together in one of all time great
33
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use conflicts.

The prospect of trying to develop a workable

accommodation which involves multi-nation distant water
fishing fleets, international shipping, and Canadian and
American oil interests boggles the imagination.
It is perhaps appropriate at this point in time to look
upon this relatively new form of multi-use conflict as adding
a new dimension to the problem of maritime safety, much like
the advent of the steamship did about a hundred years ago.
In other words, while it has not yet developed into crisis
proportions, the existence of a growing number of man-made
navigation hazards in or near busy shipping routes and port
approaches has the potential for creating a serious problem.
It is clear that an acceptable form of accommodation must be
internationally acceptable and that i t should be arrived at
prior to the generation of a crisis.

Both the offshore

operators and the shipping interests should know the rules
of the game as they invest in their respective technologies.
The discussion has properly centered on the shippingoil conflict, which is the only aspect of this class of conflict of current concern.

Other versions are on the horizon,

however, and should be considered in the same context.

Off-

shore operations such as hard mineral recovery and underwater
habitats also contain the elements for spatial conflict with
shipping operators.

It seems unlikely that they·will ~equire

anything near the level of effort which must be exerted in
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the case of offshore oil, at least for the foreseeable
future, and a workable management scheme for the latter
should be equally applicable to them.
Trends.

What of the future?

Will the problems go

away if nothing is done, or will they grow worse?

To answer

this question, one need but look at the trends in the two
major elements--ocean transportation and offshore oil.
Table I shows the growth by year of world international
seaborne trade.
TABLE I
DEVELOPMENT OF WORlD INTERNATIONAL

SEABORNE TRADE, 1959-1968

TANKER CARGO
Year

1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968

Metric tons,
millions
480
540
580
650
710
790
870
950
1020
1120

TOTAL CARGO

% change

from last
year

Metric tons,
millions
970
1080
1150
1250
1350
1510
1640
1770
1860
2050

9
13
7
12
9
11
10
9
7
10

% change

from last
year
5
11
6
9
8
12
9
8
5
10

Source: United Nations, COnferenceton1§69deT~/~/C
Development, Review of Maritime Transpor ,
•
4/66 (New York: 1969), p. 3.
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During the period from 1959 through 1968 trade developed
at a rate of 8.3% per year in terms of tonnage of all goods
loaded.
of 9.7%.

Tanker loadings increased at an average annual rate
Grovnh has been steady and most experts predict

that it will continue that way for the foreseeable future.
For the United States, it is estimated that total waterborne
foreign trade will more than quadruple from 1970 to the year
2000, growing from 391 to 1,252 long tons. 37
In anticipation of this growth, shipbuilders have forecast tonnage requirements through 1980, as shown in Table II.
It is interesting to note that in 1969, when these forecasts
were made, the predicted tanker deadweight tonnage for 1970
was 127.8 million.

According to Lloyd's of London, the

amount of tonnage actually registered in 1970 was 148.5
million tons. 38
TABLE II
MAXIMUM PROJECTED WORLD FLEET TONNAGE,

1970, 1975, and 1980
(Million deadweight tons at year end)
.,

YEAR

TANKERS

DRY CARGO VESSELS

TOTAL

1970
1975
1980

127.8
193.8
289.7

157.5
211.3
384.3

285.3
405.1
574.0

Source: United Nations, Conference on Trade and/
Development, Review of Maritime Transport, 1969,TD/B c.
4/66 (New York: 1969), p. 15.
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The nature of the world fleet is changing rapidly also.
Most significant is the appearance of a growing number of

giant tankers.

These superships, or "oilbergs" as some

have described them, are capable of carrying over 200,000
tons of liquid cargo.

As of 15 February there were 61 such
vessels in the world fleet and 294 were on current order. 39
Projections for 1980 call for tankers which will displace
one million dwt., and be a quarter of a mile long.

When one

considers that the Torrey Canyon was only one tenth the
displacement of one of these monsters, it is not too difficult to foresee the magnitude of the consequences which
would result should one be destroyed in coastal waters.
It is clear that the trend in volume of ocean trade is
increasing and that the tonnage of the world fleet will grow
to accommodate it.

Shipping technology will also change as

seen in the developments in the tanker field.

Specialized

ship configurations such as a LASH and containerships will
concentrate traffic at major ports and along specific routes.
Large investments in these new vessels and in the port facilities to handle them will place greater emphasis on maintain-

ing schedules, giving rise to greater speeds and perhaps more
40
calculated risks on the part of masters.
Obviously,
factors for increasing conflict and risk are plentiful.
The trends in offshore oil exploitation have been
adequately covered and need no further discussion.
39

It-is

sufficient to mention here that in the next 20 years the
free world energy demand will be about triple that/of the
past 100 years.

vllien taken together with the fact that the

ratio of proven domestic reserves to annual production was
reduced from 13 to 10 in the United States from 1950 to 19677 1
it is clear alternative sources are necessary.

If they exist

in the sea and are exploitable, there will be continued expansion of offshore activity.
Summar~.

Ocean transportation has been identified as

the single common element in all three categories of multipleuse conflict in offshore areas.

It has been shown that des-

pite a host of regulatory and technological measures taken
by the maritime community, the long-term trends in ship-ship
collisions and strandings has steadily moved upward.

The

consequences to coastal states, in terms of pollution and
loss of life, are giving rise to thoughts of unilateral
action to restrict vessel movements even in international
waters.

It is in the interest of maritime operators to take

the lead in developing adequate measures to control shipping
so as to reduce present casualty trends.
The conflict between shipping and offshore oil exploitation is presently minor in terms of casualties to either
element when compared to the first two categories.

The

primary source of contention is competition for unimpe~ed
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use of ocean space.

Grm1th trends in shipping and offshore

oil recovery do present a significant potentiaJ." for increased
risk of mutual hazard unless practical measures can be established to accommodate both.
Conclusions.

The present level of offshore marine

accidents is unacceptable to coastal states.

The trends

point to increased potential for such accidents unless preventive measures are taken.
Vessel routing has been applied, in one way or another,
to address each form of multiple-use conflict and its related
categories of marine accidents.

The recent reactions of

pUblic officials to marine accidents indicate a growing
interest in vessel routing schemes, or "Sealanes" as the
author prefers to call them.
The maritime community must take the lead in developing
acceptable and effective "Sealanes" or run the risk of coastal
states taking the initiative and implementing a system which
will be unreasonably prejudicial to shipping interests.
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CHAPTER III
THE CASE FOR MANDATORY "SEAIMJES"

Basic Approach to Conflict Resolution.

Unless preven-

tive measures are taken the level and complexity of the
multiple-use conflicts previously discussed will grow.

An

acceptable approach to the problem will be one which addresses all three conflict categories and, at the same time,
minimizes the contribution of major causative factors.

It

should do so without undue penalty to any particular use and
at minimum cost to coastal states.

To be effective it must

be enforceable without discrimination in a manner acceptable
both to the coastal states and to those operating off their
shores.

The nature of the conflicts and their tar-reaching

consequences dictates a regime which transcends the boundary
between territorial sea and international waters.
It 1s obvious that the most promising approach toward
accommodation will involve measures to reduce accidents
involving ocean-going vessels.

The most desirable measure

or measures will simultaneously address all three categories
of accidents which have been identified:

ship-ship colli-

sions, ship-structure collisions, and strandings.
Prevention of Ship-Ship Collisions.

Head to head meeting

situations create the greatest danger of collisions be~een

42

vessels.

Since the relative speeds are the highest in this

situation, it carries with i t the greatest potential for
serious damage or loss of li£e. 1 The danger is particularly
significant in poor visibility which increases uncertainty
as to the intentions of the other vessel, thus delaying preventive action until it is too late.
The obvious approach to prevent this type of accident
is to separate opposing streams of ship traffic widely enough
so as to minimize the chances for head-on encounters.

This

conclusion was first reached in 1855 by Lt. Matthew Fontaine
Maury of the U.S. Navy.

It led to the first North Atlantic

Track Agreement in 1898 which separated opposing streams of
vessels crossing the North Atlantic. 2 Commencing in 1911,
separate ftupbound" and "downbound" courses were established
in the Greak Lakes and, more recently, several coastal states
have implemented a series of !MCa approved "TraffiC Separation Schemes.,,3
It is safe to say that the maritime community is generally agreed that a form of vessel routing or traffic separation
is needed to reduce the frequency of collisions.

Unfortun-

ately, it has not been so consistent in its support for
implementing compulsory schemes which are needed to ensure
the success of this approach.
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Prevention of Stranding.

Most stranding incidents occur

in congested harbors and narrow channels, however, 3tatistics
compiled by the U.S. Coast Guard show that over 13% occur in
the open ocean. 4 It is the latter which result in the greatest loss, primarily because the vessel is likely to break up
due to tide and wave action.

The principle cause has been
shown to be personnel error, particularly in open water. 5

Some of the more specific factors are sloppy navigation,
lack of local knowledge, adverse weather, and unknown tide
and current effects.

To these can be added a growing ten-

dency on the part of masters to take calculated risks in
order to meet schedules, and a deterioration in their general
6
competence to handle today1s larger and faster vessels.
There are several steps which might be taken to reduce
the frequenc:y of strandings such as improved aids to navigation, more effective dissemination of information on local
navigation hazards, and better tide and current information.
These steps do not address the competency of the master, his
willingness to take risks nor adverse weather.
Since the coastal state should have the most complete
knowledge of all factors affecting navigation safety off
its coast, it should be in a position to develop routes
which, if followed, would ensure safe passage of vessels
under all conditions.

If adherence was compulsory, and the
e to guarantee-the
existing aids to navigation were a d equat
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mariner's ability to use them in all weather, they should
virtually eliminate strandings such as that of the Torrex
Canyon.
Prevention of Vessel-Structure Collisions.
of offshore resources will continue to grow.

The recovery

The mariner,

albeit grudgingly, has come to realize this as a fact of
life.

He realizes that the sea is no longer solely his

domain and that he is on the defensive against the encroachers.
Accommodation is inevitable and with every accommodation the
mariner will be the one who is giving up something which has
always been his--navigable ocean space.

The main thrust of

his activities will be to preserve the maximum possible
amount of structure-free water along major sea routes and
at the approaches to ports.

He will resist being constrained

to areas which will not accommodate growth in the size and
speed of his ships.

He will also resist being forced to

follow circuitous routes such as presently existin the Gulf
of Mexico, or routes which are not serviced by adequate aids
to navigation.?
Oil exploration is expensive and the location of productive deposits uncertain.

For these reasons oil interests

will insist on the widest possible latitude in carrying out
their offshore operations.

They will resist attempts to

close off areas of the continental shelf which look pr?mising
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prior to having suru{ test wells from mobile rigs.

Also,

having determined that oil does e..Ls t in an area, they will
press for drilling rights even in heavily traveled shipping
routes.
At the present time international law does not assign
primacy in use o£ the sea to either o£ these two competing
uses.

The main instrument which addresses this form of
conflict is the Convention on the Continental Shelf. 8 Article

5 (2) authorizes coastal states to erect structures on the
continental shelf and to establish safety zones which must,
under Article 5 (3), be observed by ships of all nationalities.

Article 5 (1) makes a very subjective statement to

the effect that exploration and exploitation shall not cause
"unjustifiable tr interference with navigation, without qualification.

The only apparent support in favor of the shipping

industry is contained in Article 5 (6) which prohibits offshore installations where "• • • Interference may be caused
to the use of recognized sealanes essential to international
navigation."

But here again the statement is caveated with

sUbjective terms such as "recognized" and "essential."
question is:

The

who is authorized to interpret these terms?

Are there any recognized trsealanes?"
At this poi~t in time it appears as though the interpretation is made by the coastal state, as has been done by the
United states in the Gulf of Mexico and in the Santa Barbara
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Channel, and as is about to be done by the United Kingdom
in the North Sea. * So far no one has challenged this assUmption of authority to take unilateral actions which have such
an obvious impact on international shipping.
The approach which is apparently developing to resolve
this form of use conflict has two distinct objectives;

that

of preventing ship collisions with structures that already
exist; and that of preventing the emplacement of structures
which will unjustifiably impede navigation.

Both objectives

are served by a form of vessel routing called Shipping Safety
Fairways.10

In the first case, vessels are routed around

those structures which already exist.

In the second case,

pre-determined vessel routes are to be kept clear of structures to prevent future hazard.

As with all other existing

, routing schemes, adherence to these schemes by masters is
voluntary.
Mandatory Sealanes - the Logical Answer.

It is quite

clear that vessel routing schemes, if properly developed and
adhered to, have the potential to significantly reduce all
*The Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom has
proposed to the Board of Trade a series of "clearwaystt
off the east coast of Britain, which are recommended to
be kept free of offshore structures. This approach very
much resembles the system of Shipping Safety Fairways
which exist in the Gulf of Mexico, except that they will
not be overprinted on navigational charts, at least for
the present.~
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·forms of marine accidents which have been previously discussed.

The fact that such schemes are already in use has

been mentioned, though only in passing. *

It is safe to say

that, until recently, there had been no effort to standardize
on vessel routing schemes nor to require masters of vessels
to adhere to them.

Those which presently exist vary widely

in structure and application.

In some cases, where they

have been implemented to resolve one particular limited type
of conflict, they have succeeded in creating another.
What is required in order to effectively address the
problem of marine accidents is a standardized system of
"Sealanes" which combines traffic separation, safe routes
through natural and man-made hazards, and security from encroachment by competing users of ocean space.

The term

"Sealanes" has been deliberately chosen ovi:» others such
as Traffic Separation Scheme or Shipping Safety Fairway.
The principle reason for this is that the language of Article
5 (6) of the Convention on the Continental Shelf uses it,

albeit undefined, in addressing the problem of conflict
between shipping and the exploitation of shelf resources.
No other descriptive terms are used in any of the applicable
*The details of the development and structure of
vessel routing ~chemes are discussed in Appendix II.
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conventions dealing with shipping problems.*
It might be appropriate to merely classify Shipping
Safety Fairways, Traffic Separation Schemes, and others as
forms of "Sealanes" for purposes of international law.

The

main point is that they must be given some legal status both
for the purpose of protecting them from encroachment and to
provide a means for requiring their observance by masters.
It is the position of the author that "Sealanes" will only
be successful in reducing marine accidents if adherence to
theD) is made compulsory at least by some classes of vessels,
particularly those which by virtue of their size, speed, or
nature of cargo pose a major threat to the well-?eing of
coastal inhabitants.

Perhaps even more importantly, ALL

vessels which operate within "Sealanes" must be compelled
to adhere to lane discipline.
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CRAPI'ER IV

RECENT EXPERIENCE WITH SEALAl\1ES
The Involvement of IMCO.

Commencing in May 1967, the

first in a series of modern Sealane Systems was implemented
by the U.S. Coast Guard at the approaches to the Port of New
York.

This was followed one month later by a traffic separation scheme in the Strait of Dover. 1 Both of these schemes

have several things in common:

(1) they are approved by

IMCO; (2) they incorporate traffic separation; (3) they conform to standards laid down by !MCO; (4) they are overprinted
on regular navigation charts; (5) they are served by adequate
aids to navigation; and (6) they are merely recommended
routes with no legal status in international law. * The
purpose of these and many other vessel routing schemes which
have since been adopted by IMeO is to,
• • • produce an orderly flow of traffic for the
purpose of reducing the risk of collisions and/or
strandings, mainly in ar~as of converging routes
or high traffic density.
IHCO is the only internationa1. body with responsibility
for estab1.ishing and recommending, on an internationa1. leve1.,
vessel routing schemes or areas to be avoided by certain
*The development and structure of these schemes
is discussed in Appendix II.
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classes of vessels.

The principles which underly its approval

of schemes, proposed by member governments, are contained in
its publication, "Ship's Routing and Traffic Separation
Schemes,"* which is now in its second edition.'

!MCa recog-

nizes the multiple-use conflicts and the trends which have
been discussed in earlier chapters.

The schemes which it

has approved so far incorporate features which simultaneously
address the maritime safety aspects of all forms of conflict,
and it is hoped that this will continue to be the case.
The Question of Effectiveness.

A natural question to be

asked is whether or not this new approach has any hope of
success where so many others have failed.
weaknesses?

What'are its

Do masters comply with the recommended schemes?

Can IMCQ-approved schemes be encroached upon?

Has there been

a reduction of shipping accidents since the various schemes
were implemented?
Problems of Non-compliance.

In a

s~~ey

conducted

by

the U.S. Coast Guard in 1968 it was determined that 90% of
the 250 masters who responded always used the Sealanes whep
approaching the Port of New York.

Eight percent used them

*This publication may be procured from the Publication
Section, Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organization 101-104 Piccadily, London, WIV OAE, England. A good
disc~ssion is also contained in H.O. 1400, "Pilot Chart of
the North Atlantic," February 1971.
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part of the time and two percent stated they did not use them
at all.

4 The greatest single complaint was that other ves-

sels were not complying with lane discipline.

One third of

those who responded to the questionnaires urged that the
Sealanes should be made compulsory, even though this question
was not specifically asked of them.

Surveys have also been

conducted in the Strait of Dover to determine the degree of
compliance there.

One such survey, conducted by the British

government, showed 10% of the vessels in the Strait traveling
against the normal flow of traffic in the routing scheme. 5
Such statistics have not been reported for other Sealane
systems, however, many masters have pointed to

~assenger

and cargo vessels as major violators of lane discipline in
the Persian Gulf area and off western Europe. 6

It would

appear from most indications, on both sides of the Atlantic,
that about 9 out of 10 masters are complying with recommended
routes which have been approved by
The Problem of Encroachment.

IMeo.
Two principle activities

exist which might encroach upon established Sealanes.

These

are oil recovery, which has been previously discussed, ana
commercial fishing.
To date oil has made no attempt to move into IMCO
approved schemes.

The most likely areas in which this type

of controversy might erupt in the near future are in the
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Santa Barbara

Channe~where

Sealanes traverse a rapidly

developing oil recovery area, and in the North Sea.

IMca

recognizes that the U.S. failure to take early action in the
Gulf of Mexico has created a potentially dangerous situation.
Accordingly, the General Assembly of IMCO, in October 1969,
adopted a resolution calling upon member states to ensure
the existence of unobstructed shipping routes and sea
approaches through offshore recovery areas at all stages
of exploitation.

Action is to be taken to implement routing

schemes at an early stage, taking into account principles
adopted by IMCO. 7 The rights of governments to exploit the
resources of their shelf is recognized by a proyision for
adjusting established routing systems as necessary.8

The

strength of this resolution remains to be demonstrated.
The problem of encroachment upon Sealanes by commercial
fishermen and pleasure boaters already exists and may well
be more difficult for IMCO to address, let alone remedy.
The first notable incident within U.S. Sealanes occurred in
May 1967.

The S.S. Christoforo Colombo, enroute to New York,

encountered a fleet of Russian trawlers operating in the .
inbound lane. 9 This ve~sel was forced to maneuver continuously to avoid numerous small vessels, not all of which were
Russian.

Since there was a dense fog at the time, the acci-

dent potential was quite high.

Similar complaints have been

received from the other side of the Atlantic, where suggestions
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have even been made to restrict fishermen from operating
10
in Sealanes.
The impracticality of such a suggestion is
obvious, given the freedom of fish to move about without
regard to man's artificial boundaries.

Nevertheless, in

the view of the Coast Guard, some solution is required.

The

obstruction of Sealanes by fishing vessels and pleasure
craft remains as the most serious problem being encountered
by vessels using them in the approaches to U.S. ports. 11
Pleasure craft are operated by a rapidly expanding population of what constitutes the most immature and unmanageable
group of seafarers on the world's oceans.

If they had the

best of intentions, it is unlikely that they

co~ld

navigate

with sufficient accuracy to remain out of Sealanes, even if
they knew they existed.

The problem is somewhat mitigated

by the fact that they seldom travel far out to sea and are
thus encountered in more or less predictable locations.
addition, they are:

In

(1) indigenous to the coastal state and

thus somewhat controllable; (2) maneuverable so that they
can usually avoid danger at the last moment; and (3) unbelievably lucky.

Most encounters can be expected to end uP.

with nothing worse than a badly frightened ship's master,
provided he has maneuvering room and there are no other
large ships about.
With commercial fishing vessels the problem is more
significant.

There exists a large growing fleet of distant
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water fishing vessels, international in character, often
quite large and comprising a significant financial investment.

As has been shown, they can be encountered

on the high seas where fish are present.

an~lhere

When engaged in

fishing operations their maneuverability is restricted.
This is recognized by Rule 26 of the International Rules
for Preventing Collision at Sea, 1960, which requires all
other vessels, except those not under effective control, to
remain clear.

If this rule is applied rigidly to vessels

which are proceeding in recognized Sealanes, much of their
value in reducing the collision hazard will have been lost.
This will be particularly true when the non-fishing vessel
is forced into maneuvering close to the opposite lane as
was the Cristoforo Colombo.
Effectiveness of Sealanes in Reducing Accidents.

At

this point in time no "expert" will step forward and point
to the success of Sealanes in reducing shipping accidents.
There are too many factors involved in present accident
statistics such as growth trends in shipping and deteriorating
capabilities of masters, particularly those of the growing
"flag of convenience" fleets.

The first place to look for

significant improvement is in the Strait of Dover, which
has had such a poor long-term record.

There are those who

claim that vessel routing has indeed resulted in fewe~
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accidents in the Strait. 12

Others deny it vehemently,

pointing to indefensible caveats used by proponents in

qualifying their conclusions. 13

The Q~qualified fact of

the matter is that for the 44 months before and

a~ter

the

Dover Strait scheme was implemented the collision rate has
been about constant.

The best that has been said for it is

that the number of accidents per fog day has been reduced.
Despite conflicting views on the success of the present
scheme, all agree that separation is necessary.

It is only

the mechanics of the system which is the subject of controversy.

The Coast Guard has pointed out that no collisions

have occurred within the Sealanes which it has established.
Its confidence in the concept is well founded on the longterm success of the traffic separation schemes which were
established in the Great La.1;:es. 14

.

As pointed out in the discussion in Chapter II, there
was a change in stranding trends starting in 1967.

The time

frame is too short to determine whether or not this is a
long-term change attributable to vessel routing.

Neverthe-

less, it did commence with the year following the implemen~
tation of the original schemes.

Unfortunately, overall

collision statistics have not yet taken an identifiable
downward turn.
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Weaknesses in Present Sch(;mes.

Setting aside differ-

ences of opinion over the physical structure of particular
traffic separation schemes, the overwhelming majority of
those who have been involved with them support their need.
The support of ship's masters was established at an early
point in time by the Institute of Navigation15 and has been
verified by several administrations.

Indeed, it has been

the administrations which have taken the more conservative
approach, especially with regard to compulsory use of
Sealanes. 16 This being the cas8, why have they not been
more effective in reducing the number of collisions?
The author contends that experience in the Strait of
Dover clearly proves that even as little as 10% non-compliance by vessels operating in a Sealane can render it incapable
of meeting its objective.

.

In fact, one might even consider

the situation worse than no Sealane at all.

Those who do

comply might well be lulled into a false sense of security
and, thus, not be as alert as they should for oncoming vessels.
It is obvious that the lack of authority to enforce
mandatory compliance with lane discipline has weakened the
effectiveness of the Sealane concept.

It is, perhaps, not

realistic or necessary to require all vessels to use established Sealanes.

It is, however, both realistic and necessary
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to require all vessels which operate within them to comply
with rules meant to ensure safety of navigation.
The fact that Sealanes are not presently protected
from encroachment by fishing vessels and pleasure craft is
another very significant weakness, and one which will be
difficult to remedy.

Article 1 (1) of the Convention on

Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High
Seas 17 and Article 2 (2) of the Convention on the High seas 18
will limit the actions which the coastal state may take to
keep fishing vessels from operatine in the Sealanes which
it establishes beyond its territorial sea.

The author knows

of no provision in conventions dealing with the Law of the
Sea which addresses this problem, other than Rule 26 of the
Regulations for Preventing Collision at Sea, 1950, which
restrains fishing vessels from obstructing "fairways" which
are used by vessels other than fishing vessels.

Had the

term "Sealane" or "vessel routing scheme" been used there
would be some basis for resolving the conflict.
Present schemes do not address the problem of crossing
traffic adequately.

Under the existing International Re~a

tions for Preventing Collision at Sea, a vessel proceeding
in accordance with the prescribed traffic pattern may be
forced to give ~ay to vessels crossing the lane.

Under con-

ditions where there is heavy crossing traffic, it could well
be forced out of the lane in carrying out prescribed maneuvers.
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This is precisely the point which has been at issue in the
controversy between the Trinity House and the United Kingdom
Board of Trade. 19

The problem is exacerbated by the trend

toward increased size and reduced maneuverability of giant
vessels.

Furthermore, while the vessel crossing a Sealane

system is aware of the possibility of oncoming traffic,
those which are in it may not be quite as alert to impending
crossing situations.

This can be a factor of significance

in areas like the Strait of Dover where so much crosschannel traffic exists.
Problems also exist with visual aids to navigation used
to mark vessel routing schemes.

As various nations develop

their own Sea1anes they will service them with the bu~yage
and other aids to navigation which have been locally adopted.
At present there exists a wide variety of such systems.

They

differ enough so as to make it impractical for the international maritime community to familiarize itself with all
of them.

Of particular concern is the marking of hazards

such as sunken vessels which might exist within a Sealane.
Lack of standardization of this particular aspect of visual
aids to navigation may have contributed to a series of recent
accidents in the Strait of Dover, where entirely different
20
systems of buoyage exist on the French and British sides.
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Recent Actions of the United Kingdom.

Is 90% compliance

adequate to insure the success of traffic separation schemes?
The government of the United Kingdom thinks not.

It analyzed

40 collisions which occurred in the English Channel after the
implementation of vessel routing in 1967.

Seventeen of them
involved vessels which were clearly in the wrong lane. 21 In
other words, of the total analyzed, nearly half the accidents
were caused by that 10% of the total vessel population which
failed to comply with lane discipline.

One of these was the

Peruvian freighter, Paracas, which has been previously mentioned in connection with the sinking of the tanker, Texaco
Caribbean, and the disastrous sequence of accidents which
followed early in 1971. 22 Collisions have not been the only
form of casualty which resulted from non-use of the approved
routing scheme.

The Liberian tanker, Panther, grounded in

the Strait of Dover on 8 March 1971.

She leaked only a small

amount of oil, but was barely pulled free before she broke
her back. 23 This grounding would never have occurred had
she not been well outside the established traffic lane. 24
Recognizing that non-compliance with Sealane

discipl~ne

is the major factor in degrading their effectiveness, the
United Kingdom moved in March 1971 to correct this weakness.
It presented a resolution to the 23rd Session of the Maritime
Safety Committee (}ffiC) of IMCO, 15-19 March 1971, calling for
member governments to make i t an offense for vessels carrying
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their flag to proceed against the established flow of traffic
in the Dover Strait.

This was the first proposal ever pre-

sented to IMCO to compel vessels to adhere to Sealane
discipline.

It was amended, at the urging of the United

States Delegation, to include all
schemes.

!}~O-approved

routing

The amended proposal was unanimously approved,

with a minimum of debate, by the r~c.25 It has been recommended for adoption by all IMCO member governments.

This

action by IMCa is strongly supported by the International
Chamber of Shipping (ICS) which represents over half of
world shipping tonnage.

rcs has cautioned member governments

that such measures, as they relate to the high seas, are useless unless the governments of the world develop means to
ensure compliance. 26
The 23rd Session of MSC addressed some of the other
weaknesses of the present system of vessel routing schemes
by:

(1) recommending that the International Association of

Lighthouse Authorities (lALA) extend the scope of ongoing
studies to include the problem of unifying buoyage in international waters, especially for marking wrecks and other
hazards; (2) improving the dissemination of navigational
warnings to shipping; and (3) by instructing its Working
Group on Revision of Collision Regulations to consider the
inclu~ion

of rules compelling observance of approved traffic
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separation schemes. 27

The problem of encroachment remains

to be squarely addressed.
Summary.

The world maritime community and interested

coastal states are alert to the consequences of multiple-use
conflict over the continental shelf.
undertaken through

Attempts are being

IMca to standardize both the structure

and application of vessel routing schemes.

Several weak-

nesses exist in the present system, primarily because many
of the related conventions which have been adopted have been
drafted and approved as though they were unrelated.

Semantic

problems stemming from non-uniform terminology weaken the
interpretation of these conventions as they apply to the
regulation of offshore activities which conflict.
Maritime nations and private interest are aware that
laissez

fair~

can no longer be tolerated on the high seas

in the vicinity of coastlines.

Accordingly, measures are

being proposed through the international forum provided by

!Mea

to regulate more strictly the activities of maritime

operators.
Conclusions.

For the first time in documented history

maritime nations and private shipping operators are assuming
the lead in implementing measures which will restrict traditional aspects of "freedom of the sea."
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These measures must

be effective in order to preclude unilateral restrictions
being imposed by coastal states.

To be effective, the

international community must develop regimes which will
permit their enforcement regardless of the limitations of
national jurisdiction.
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CHAPTE,."1, V
F:lOBL""lIS TO BE SOLVED

Introduction.

It has been argued that Sealanes can be

a useful device in resolving multiple-use conflict on the
continental shelf.

It has also been argued that in order

to be effective those who operate within them must be compelled to adhere to applicable procedures.

Some vessels.

by the nature of their potential for creating hazards or
dis-economies for third parties. must be required to use
routing schemes which have been adopted by

!Meo.

Prior to

achieving these goals some problems remain to be worked out.
The author does not presume to be learned enough in
all of the various ramifications to propose acceptable solutions to the many problems which surround effective implementation of compulsory Sealanes.

There are some areas which

can be pointed out which deserve the attention of those who
are.
Problems in Application.

The first and most important

step has been taken to compel adherence to prescribed rules
for vessels operating within a routing scheme.

The next

step. where pollution prevention is concerned. is to require
certain classes of vessels. for example tankers. to use
adopted routes.

This problem has not yet been addressed but
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it cannot be avoided.

It has already been pointed out that

stranding is the greatest cause of total loss and has
contributed more to coastal pollution than has collision
between vessels.

V~ndatory

compliance will also be an

absolute necessity for vessels proceeding through areas
which are densely populated with offshore oil structures.
Major tanker operators have realized the advantages in complying and have instructed their masters to follow approved
routes. 1
It appears sensible at this point in time to amend the
International Regulations for Preventing Collision at Sea,
1960, so as to require all vessels within a scheme to comply
with prescribed traffic flow and for certain classes of
vessels to be required to use adopted schemes.
The structure of Sealanes, as approved by IMCO, has
failed to address the crossing problem.

Apparently, this

has been left to the existing International Regulations for
Preventing Collision at Sea, 1960.

The consequences of this

deficiency may not show up until more significant problems,
such as compulsory adherence and mandatory use, are ironed
out.

Nevertheless, the crossing problem exists now and may

well be a significant factor in those collisions in the
Strait of Dover which have not been attributed to vessels
running counter to prescribed traffic flow.
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A system of "controlled" crossing zones is required in
areas such as the Strait of Dover.

Crossing vessels must

be compelled to enter Sealanes at minimum prescribed angles,
preferably at designated crossing points.

Canada has ad-

dressed this problem in its recent Sealane proposal to IMCO. 2
It is the Canadian government's intention to strictly control
junctions and areas where routes cross so as to prevent
"Stray" crossings.3

This may inconvenience some mariners,

but i f adhered to it should improve the workability of the
scheme.

It is not enough, however.

The International Regu-

lation for Preventing Collision at Sea must be amended so as
to give primacy to vessels which are proceeding in a Sealane
over those that would cross.

The concept of "burdened

vessel" should be amended such that crossing vessels are
automatically "burdened" and, therefore, required to give
way.

Such a departure from the age-old rule of giving way

only to a vessel on the starboard hand will meet with fierce
resistance from the conservative maritime community.

If

they can accept the concept of compulsory Sealanes, they
should be able to see the need for respecting the rights
of those who use them.
The problem of encroachment by fishing vessels has the
potential for creating some serious accidents in which the
fisherman is more apt to be the loser.

A workable solution

would seem to be one which permits the fishermen to operate
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within a traffic separation scheme provided that they move
in a direction consistent with the prescribed fiow of traf-

fic.

They should not be permitted to operate in controlled

crossing areas or route junctions.

It should be possible to

amend the Regulations for Preventing Collision at Sea, 1960,
by expanding Rule 26 to include the behavior of fishing
vessels within IMCQ-approved vessel routing schemes.
Problems of Enforcing Compliance.
the

~$C

The proposal which

has approved calls for member nations to make it an

offense for vessels flying their flag to violate Sealane
discipline. 4

The nature of punishing violators is not pre-

scribed nor is there any implication that coastal state:.
may proceed against violators.

Indeed, the latter is ex-

pressly prohibited by Article 11 (1) of the Convention on
the High Seas which states that only the flag state or state

-

nationality may proceed against a master for incidents involving navigation or collision.
It is unlikely that the Convention on the High Seas
can be modified to accommodate the need of the coastal state
to protect itself.

It would, therefore, be wiser for IMCO

to agree on some specific minimum penalties which flag states
would be required to assess against masters found guilty of
non-compliance where it is required.

This approach should

also be applicable to the problem of encroachment by fishing
vessels.
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Given the lack of a firm stand on the part of a flag
state to compel its vessels to adhere to Sealanes, what can
be done?

Some thought has been given to encouraging under-

writers to tailor their premiums to reflect the record of
a shipping company or state in complying with schemes.

Un-

fortunately, the way the business is run, rates are based
solely upon accident statistics and are applied to a vessel
rather than the master.

Thus, underwriting being a competi-

tive business, this form of leverage would be applied after
the fact of an accident.

It would be too late to benefit

the offended state or states.
A more likely approach would be for member nations of

IMCa to collectively refuse violators access to their ports.
This form of coercion could be applied to either the master
or the organization for which he works.

Such a policy should

be adopted as a formal Resolution by IMCa and proposed to the
General Assembly.
The alternative to effective enforcement of vessel
routing schemes is clearly unacceptable to shipping nations.
Should shipping accidents continue without a clear reversal
in trend, coastal states may well create new regimes by unilaterally extending their territorial jurisdiction to the
limit of the continental shelf, including the super-adjacent
waters.
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Technological Problems of Enforcement.

~.

For the coastal

state, one of the more significant enforcement problems will
be that of
tors.

pol~cir~

the Sealanes to detect and report viola-

The magnitude of such a job can be appreciated when

one considers

t~at

the Sealanes leading to the Port of New

York extend 200 miles to sea, well beyond the range of landbased radar.

The cost of this aspect of enforcement can be

quite high and must be considered in the context of the
threat to the coastal area.

In order to re-!,lin respect for

the status of Sealanes, they should not be

im~Jlemented

where

they cannot be kept under some form of surveillance, at least
occasionally.
The problem of standardizing visual aids to navigation
has been mentioned, but there is another aspect to the problem.

In order to be effective when they are needed the most,

Sealanes must be serviced by a system of all-weather aids.
This implies electronic aids in some instances.

The cost

of such systems could be quite high and should be considered
when structuring routing schemes.

They must have sufficient

dimensions to permit navigators to remain within them, using
available aids.

If this is not done it will be difficult to

fault the master who is involved in an accident because he
is in the wrong lane.
The Next Law of the Sea Conference.

Many Conventions

exist which relate to the subject of multiple-use conflict.
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They are not consistent in their views of priorities nor
in the terminology which they employ.

It would· be "lise to

review all of them prior to the next Law of the Sea Conference to determine vnlere they conflict and/or where semantic
problems inhibit their sensible application to real world
problems.

Those who attend the preliminary sessions prior

to the Conference I:tight do well to develop an internationally acceptable glossary of all terms relating to Law of
the Sea matters.

They should be understandable to the

layman as well as the international la",ryer.
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TABLE III
SUMMARY OF VESSEL LOSSES DUE TO COLLISION,
STRANDING, AND CONTACT DAMAGE~ 1956-1969a
(Number of Vessels
Collision
Partial Total
Loss
Loss

Year

j

-o

\.r.)

1506
1272
1368
1577
1460
1621
1804
1793
1753
1945
1768
1566
1595
1624
1471

1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970

20
20
23
22
19
23
16
40
29
25
42
34
23
45

-

Stranding
Partial Total
Loss
Loss
1026
960
959
948
962
922
925
978
1041
1038
1013
848
909
854
800

61
73
56
73
72
80
123
116
108
121
120

146
142
107

-

Contact
Partial
Loss
1322
1277
1413
1686
1699
1723
1590
1607
1512
1583
1646
167/+
1647
1359
1136

Total
Partial Total
Loss
Loss
7912
7243
6857
7259
7254
7740
7814
7860
8317
8884

9088
8333
8627
8024
7170

163
163
160
181
171
189
249
254
249
277
312
337
326
327

-

% of TotalC % damageb
Fleet
Damaged
39.0
34.6
31.3
32.2
32 02
33.62
33047
33.21
34.61
36.26
36.03
32.18
32.54
29.21
25.27

aLosses due to foundering, burning or missing are not included.
bpercent of total vessels damaged which was due to collision.
cPercent of total world fleet damaged from all causes •

.

Source:

Annual Reports of the Committee, The Liverpool Underwriters
Association, 1957-1971 (London: 1971), v.p.

due to
Collision
19
17.5
20.0
21 07
20.2
20.9
23.2
22.8
21.0
22.0
19.5
18.8
18.5
20.2
20.6
01
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THE HISTORY OF SEALANES
Introduction.

The term "Sealanes" can mean different

things to different people.

In general, it brings to mind

a system of vessel routing which exists either by design
or because trade patterns dictate that it be so.

Sealanes

may be developed for the purpose of separating opposing
traffic streams, in which case they are called Traffic Separation Schemes; they may be designed to route ships through
or around man-made hazards, in which case they are called
"fairways" or "clearways"; or they may be intended to constrain certaic types of vessels to follow minimum risk paths
to avoid natural hazards, in which case they are referred
to as Routing Schemes.
-

For the purpose of the discussion which follows, the
term Sealanes refers to those vessel routing schemes which
have been

speci~ically

designed to cause vessels to conform

to pre-determined paths.

vlhen used without qualification,

the term refers to schemes which perform all three of the
above functions.
It should be pointed out that the term Sealane is used
primarily in the United States to identify only those schemes
which incorporate traffic separation.

The

IMea

does not use

the term at all in describing any of the systems which it

95

approves to perform the above functions.

IMCO-approved

terminology for international usage was arrived Oat as a
result of a poll conducted by the International Hydrographic
Bureau among its members.
"Sealanes" is unfortunate.

IMCO's failure to adopt the term
Had it done so, its approved

schemes would have fallen under the protective umbrella of
Article 5 (6) of the Convention on the Continental Shelf.
The difference between "Sealane system" and "traffic separation scheme " is admittedly semantic; however, semantics
play a

sigr~ficant

role in matters of law and jurisdiction.

An Old Concept.

The concept of sealanes or traffic

separation schemes is not a new one, however, the structure
and applications have gone through many changes.

The first

proposal for ship routing was made by Lt. Matthew Fontaine
Maury, of the U.S. Navy, in 1847.

On

the basis of an ex-

haustive study of weather and current observations from
thousands of ships' log books, Maury developed his "Wind and
Current Charts of the North Atlantic. ,,1

He supplemented

these in 1848 with his "Track Charts," "Pilot Charts," and
"sailing Directions," which recommended, according to
seasonal weather patterns, least time tracks between major
ports. 2 His wc.k was published by the Naval Observatory
and Hydrographical Office, and it is the basis upon which
the U.S. Havy Oceanographic Office produces its current
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f1 *
series of "Pilot Charts.
Th~e
.

.

pr~mary

goal of this first

attempt at ship routing was to achieve reduced time enroute
rather than safety, and it is claimed to hav8 saved ship
operators millions of dollars per year in trans-Atlantic
crossings.3
The North Atlantic Track Agreement.

The first proposal

to separate ship traffic for safety reasons was also made
by Maury in 1855.
relieved

~hipts

The advent of steam-powered vessels had

masters of the need to follow the previously

developed weather routing schemes, which tended naturally to
separate opposing traffic streams.

They preferred, instead,

to use more direct great circle routes which consumed less
time and conserved precious fuel.
increased the

probabi~ity

This practice, however,

of head to head meeting situations.

In the case of ship traffic between northern Europe and
North America, it also meant crossing the Grand Banks of
Newfoundland, all too frequently in thick fog.

Thus, the

invention of the steamship, the most significant advance in
ocean technology since man had learned to use the sail centuries earlier, created the situation which led to the
*All of the current series of "PiJot Charts" produced
by the U.S. Navy Oceanographic Office bear the following
inscription, "Founded upon the researches made ~n the early
part of the nineteenth century by Matthew Fonta~ne Maury~
while aerv mg as a Lieutenant in the United States Navy.
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Unfortunately, it was weakened by its non-mandatory nature
and limited participation. * The Agreement, which was based
on Maury's work, is still in effect, although the lane
structure has undergone several revisions.

The most recent

Atlantic Lane Routes are shown in Figure 7.

Recently ship-

ping companies have indicated a desire to abrogate the
Ag~"eement in favor of weather routing, 9 an interesting
reversion to the older Maury concept.
The

Great~kes

Routing System.

The next significant

attempt to reduce ship collisions by means of traffic separation schemes occurred in the Great Lakes.

During the

period frcm 1900 to 1910, 22 vessels were totally lost on
the Lakes due to collisions. 10 As a result, in 1911, the
Lake Carriers' Association established separate upbound and
downbound courses for member vessels on Lakes Huron and
Superior.

These were actual prescribed courses to be fol-

lowed, as opposed to the previously described traffic lanes,
11
and were overprinted on charts by the U.S. Lake Survey.
The Lake Superior routes are shown in Figure 8.

Since they

*At the time of the Andrea Doria~Stockholm collision
in 1956, neither of the parent steamslip lines was a party
to the North Atlantic Track Agreement. The 1957 House of
Representatives Safety of Life at Sea Study Report stated
that adLerence to the published sealanes would have prevented this tragic accident, which took the lives of 44
persons.
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FIGURE 7
NORTH ATLANTIC TRACK ROUTES
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were devised by the masters of ships engaged in the Great
Lakes trade, they were qUickly accepted by both ·United
States and Canadian operators. 12 Convinced of the success
of this pioneering effort, the Lake Carriers' Association
and the Dominion Marine Association of Canada expanded-the
schemes to Lake Michigan, in 1926; Lake Erie, in 1947;- and
Lake Ontario, in 1949.

One of the more interesting aspects

of the Great Lakes scheme is that it was privately conceived
of and implemented in the interests of safety, without the
need for legislative action.
ported it in various ways:

The U.S. government has supby recognition in Admir2lty

courts; overprinting on Lake Survey Charts; inclusion in
the Great Lakes Pilot; and by citing failure to adhere to
prescribed routes as a causal factor in Coast Guard Marine
Boards of Investigation into collisions. 13 The success of
the traffic separation scheme on the Great Lakes is a generally accepted fact which is borne out by the significant
reduction in the rate of collision since its implementation.
Despite the injection of ocean shipping through the St.
Lawrence Seaway in 1959, and a significant growth in the
volume of normal lake shipping over the years, the decade
from 1954 through 1963 saw only two major ship losses as a

.

In both c~ses failure to adhere to
-,-'
f
t
14
prescribed routes was cited as a contribu~~ng ac or.

result of collision.
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~mDRI

Routes.

World War II led to the next major

requirement for a ship routing scheme.

During the war, both

Allied and Axis naval forces extensively mined the waters
of the North Sea, Mediterranean Sea, and Black Sea.

As the

tide of battle turned in favor of the Allies, the need for
seaborne traffic increased in these areas.

The Allied

navies swept mine-free channels, as traffic patterns dictated, and established buoys and other aids to enable
navigators to

~ocate

them.

The Royal Navy issued a system

of publications called Northern European and Mediterranean
Routing Instructions (NEMEDRI) which identified swept channels and contained sailing directions and hydrographic
information to aid mariners in avoiding danger areas.

The

system of routes described in these publications became
known as NEMEDRI lanes, obviously taking their name from
the title of the publ!cation. 15
When they were originally conceived the

l~RI

were not expected to remain in effect indefinitely.

routes
Follow-

ing the war, however, it was clear that they must remain in
use until the full extent of the mine threat could be determined, and adequate mine clearance effected.

The magnitude

of the peacetime threat can be appreciated when one considers
that the British alone planted over 76,000 mines on the sea
bottom and that only about 1,600 were known to have been
detonated by enemy vessels. 16 To deal with the probl-em,
103

the Royal !mvy conceived of the International Routing and
Reporting Authority (IRRA), which was composed of naval
representatives of ten nations, including the United States,
Great Britain, and Russia.
IRRA

Until its dissolution in 1963,

functioned as an international forum in which mine

dangers, mine clearance, and ship routing problems were
discussed.

The IRRA was also responsible for promulgating,

to the mariner, ship routing schemes and relevant hydrographic

ill the. form of the NEMEDRI publication, which
is now in its tenth edition. 17
dat~

The NEMEDRI lanes served the purpose for which they
were primarily intended, that of minimizing the risk from
mines.*

As post-war trade patterns developed, additional

lanes were swept to accommodate a growing volume of seaborne
traffic.

Unfortunately, those who established them could

not foresee that they would become virtually a permanent
ship routing scheme, carrying one of the world's greatest
volumes of seaborne traffic.

They, therefore, structured

and marked them so as to prOVide mine-safe routes between
major European ports rather than to prevent collisions at
sea. 18 Figure 9 depicts the system of NEI4EDRI lanes which
*Beattie states that explodable mines are still being
recovered, but that the last known mine casualty occurre~
off Forth Holland in 1962. This testifies to the effect~ve
ness ,)f the NEI-reDRI system when one considers that over 350
ships were lost to mines off Denmark alone after the ~ar.
supra, Ch. 2, n. 9 at 41.
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exists in the Kattegat, between Denmark and Sweden.

They

are axially buoyed with the main routes varying "in width
from one to five miles, depending on the traffic volume.
The combination of the previously described grovnh in
shipping volume 2nd a residual mine threat has tended to
create large concentrations of shipping in some of the main
~D~DRI

routes.

The highest density of traffic exists on

the Borkum and Terschelling route from Rotterdam to the
Kiel Canal. 19 _An e~timated 400 ships per day use this
route and collisions occur as frequently as on any other
water-way in the world, including the infamous Strait of
Dover. 20 Figure 10 shows the location of some 57 collisions
which occurred there between 1959 and 1963. 21 Most of these
occurred in reduced visibility as a result of head to head
meeting situations off the centerline of the lane.

Radar

surveys have shown that in poor visibility approximately
10% of the vessels in the lane operate on the wrong side of
22
the axial line of buoys, against the main flow of traffic.
This apparent failure of vessels to comply with Rule 25* by
remaining on the starboard side of the channel is attributed
to a tendency on the part of masters to sail from buoy to
buoy in poor visibility.24
*The instructions contained in the ~nmRI publication
call for vessels to remain on the starboard side of th~
lane (buovs to port). Additionally, most masters cons1der
the routes as narr-ow channels where Rule 25 "The Narr~w
Channel Rule n would apply. 23
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FIGURE 10
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COLLISIONS IN THE NORTH SEA NEMEDRI ROUTES
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The NEMEDRI routing system has successfully met the
safety requirements for which it was established.

In doing

so, however, it has contributed to yet another danger, that
of collision at sea.

Several factors can be identified as

aggravating the situation.

The previously cited tendency

to concentrate traffic in restricted areas is compounded
by a generally agreed-upon deficiency in the capabilities
of many masters. 25 The existing system of aids to navigation does nEt

~pear

to provide sufficient accuracy under

all conditions of visibility.

Although most of the area is

covered by Decca Navication System, which can provide sufficient all-weather accuracy, it has been estimated that
only 25% of the vessels entering these waters are equipped
to use it. 26

The location of the systerr of visual aids to

navigation along the center of the lane tends to draw opposing
traffic streams together in poor visibility.

Failure to

observe or enforce Rule 25 and the lack of a traffic separation or buffer zone increases the probability of head to
head meeting situations which have been shown to be the major
category of collision at sea.
In recognition of the increasing th:"eat of collision in
the North Sea, proposals have been developed to widen the

NEMEDRI routes and transform them into traffic separation
schemes.

This will call for sweeping new lanes clear of mines

and marking off a buffer zone with parallel lines of cuoys,
27
as shown in Figure 11.
108

"FIGURE 11
MODIFICATION OF BORKill1 - TERSCHELLING NEMEDRI

ROUTE, TO PROVIDE TRAFFIC SEPARATION

Source: IMCO, Ship's Routeing and Traffic Separation
Schemes, (London: IMCO, 1971), p. 280
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Shipping Safety

Fai~~ays

Systems.

The effort to estab-

lish a system of "shipping safety fairways" or "c'Learways"
for shipping

actuc~ly

pre-dates the better known work of

the Institutes of Navigation of Britain, France, and the
Fede~al

Republic of Germany.

As a practical matter, however,

"fairwaysl1 were not conceived as vessel routing schemes in
the sense of those previously described.

They came into

being as a result of agitation by the shipping industry,
whicll per-ce Ived a gr.-owing encroachment, by the oil industry,
on ocean space that had previously been its virtually uncontested domain.

They were not originally meant to route

vessels safely through existing navigation hazards, but,
rather, to set aside ocean areas which would be maintained
free of man-made hazards, specifically offshore drilling
platforms. *
As early as August 1948, the American Merchant Marine
Institute (AMMI), alarmed at the potential navigation hazard
posed by offshore oil platforms, objected to the possible
issuance of a blanket permit by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to Stanolind Oil and Gas Company to drill off the
*The terms "fai~1ay" and "shipping safety fairway" are
used in this context by the U.S. government and by American
shi}::lping and oil interests. In the United Ki?gdom the ~~rm
"clearway" is preferred when referring to sucn schemes.
IMCO defines a "fairway" as "An area \d thin defined limits
inside which two-way traffic normally may be expected ;"
The terms "clearway" and "shipping safety fairway" do .not
appear in the IMCO glossary.29
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entrar.ce to Galveston harbor. 30

After a series of confer-

ences with the oil and 2hipping interests, the Corps District
Engineer, Galveston District, r-ecommended a fainlay five
nautical miles wide in which no structures would be permitted.

Stanolind was issued a number of single drilling

permits outside of the recommended fairway and the first
hopeful step toward conflict resolution had been taken. 31
Further recognition of the problem was contained in a letter
from the C0!1lsDivision Engineer, Lower Mississippi Valley,
to the District Engineer, New Orleans, dated 27 October
1948, in which he stated:
This office has been giving some thought to
the necessity for providing adequate navigation
fain;~ys between the open water of the Gulf and
the various waterways and bays that empty into
or connect with the Gulf of Mexico • • • • As
the offshore oil activities increase • ~ •• The
establishment of definite criteria with respect
to the location and width of essential navigation
fairways for use in approving permits appears to
be necessary for the protection of navigation
• • • •
As offshore drilling operations increased in the Gulf
over the following years, several additional fairways were
implemented, normally on an ad hoc basis.

The sequence of

events leading to the establishment of a new fai~lay normally
commenced with the leasing, by the United States Geological
Survey, of offshore areas for oil exploration and recovery.

32

The lease also authorized offshore drilling structures,
however, under the provisions of the Rivers and Harbors Act
111

and state

~~d

local interests.

The positions of the parti-

cipants at these conferences were consistent and logical
from their own particular points of view.

The shipping and

fishing interests desired to reserve the maximum possible of
unencu~bered

ocean space.

The oil interests wished to make

maximum use of the sub-surface lands for whfch they had paid
so dearly. *

Government representatives strove for maximum

resource utilization consistent with safe naVigation.
compromise~wh~ch ~esulted

parties involved. 36

The

did not fully satisfy any of the

The Corps considered itself to be an

informal mediator, without legal authority to "designate
formally"

fai~~ys,

the United States.

except within the territorial seas of
As a result, i t considered the arrange-

ments which were reached to be a strictly "informal" agreement between the parties concerned.

The agreement was

implemented simply by the Corps refusing to issue offshore
structure permits within the agreed-upon areas. 37
The development of fairways proceeded informally and
at a leisurely pace until 1953, when the passage of the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act stimulated an increase in

*The prices paid to lease exploitable offshore lands
can be astronomical if sufficient potential is considered
to exist. In bidding for Federal lands in the Santa Barbara
Channel in February of 1968, $602,719,261.60 \'las bid for
363,181 acres. One 5,400 acre tract went for $61,418,000.00,
an average of $11,373.70 per acre. 35
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the level of offshore drilling.

Agreed-upon schemes were

generally two miles wide, ten miles long, and perpendicular
to the coastline. 38 Landward points of origin were at
selected Gulf ports and included anchorages where traffic
volume called for them.

The schemes did not appear on navi-

gation charts, were not published in the Federal Register,
and were not marked by aids to navigation. *

Ship's masters,

unfamiliar with the area, had no way of knowing they eXisted,
let alone whera_they were.

In July 1953, the Corpspublished

its first "official" map of the existing system of Gulf fairways.

SUbsequent revisions were issued as new fairways were

implemented. 39

In 1966, the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey,

assured of the stability of the existing fairways and anchorages, agreed to a suggestion by the Corpsto overprint them
on its navigation charts of the Gulf. 40 Figure 12 is a portion of C. & G.S. Chart 1116 showing "Shipping Safety Fairwaysll
and anchorage areas off Texas and Louisiana. 41 The first
publication in the Federal Register concerning fairways also
occurred in 1966, on 25 January.42

*The responsibility for establishing aids to navigation rests with the United States Coast Guard. (14 U.S.C.
81). It was not until October 1966, however, that the
Coast Guard received authority to establish maritime aids,
~enerally, in the waters above the Continental Shelf.
lPL 89-622; 14 U.S.C. 81).
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FIGURE 12
DETAILS OF SHIPPING SAFETY FAIRWAYS, GULF OF MEXICO
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The combination of rapid development of offshore oil
recovery technology and the passage of the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act gave impetus to a southward movement of
drillir~

platforms into the deeper waters of the Gulf.

Some

eXistir~

faiTI·mys were extended further to seaward and addi-

-

tional ones were added as necessary, according to theprocedures described above.

A number of them ultimately extended

to the 100 fathom curve.

So gradual was the process that

ship operators-did not seem to realize the ultimate consequences of such an ad hoc approach.

In 1965, however, the

fact struck home that although access to major ports had been
protected, no fairways had been established to accommodate
coastwise ship traff1c. 43

At the urging of the maritime

interests, the American Merchant

~Iarine

Institute (AMMI) and

the Offshore Operator's Committee (OOC) put together a joint
proposal for a revised fairways scheme which would correct
the deficiency.
Engineer in

~~y

This was presented to the Corps District

1967, and on 6 June 1967 he issued a Public

Notice describing the proposed revision. 44 The new scheme,
which is shown in Figure 13, was approved and published in
the Federal Register in October 1968.
As can be seen, the development of the present system
of fairways took place over a 20 year period.
hardly a nodel upon

,~hich

achieve the same goals.

The result is

to base future schemes meant to

They resemble the
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NEv~DRI

.

lanes in

.

FIGURE 13
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that they tend to concentrate opposing streams of traffic
in relatively nar-r-ow channel.s ,

By

their physical structure

they are far inferior, being less than half as \vide and

~~

marked by visual aids to naVigation.
The present system of Shipping Safety Fairways generates
an extremely 11igh potential for head-on meeting situations.
The fact that many vessels which operate out of Gulf ports
do not use them is the main reason that the collision rate
there is not

m~ch h~gher.

It is already bad enough, having

averaged better than one per month over the five year period
ending on 30 June 1970. 45 More than half of the collisions
which occurred in the open ocean adjacent to the United
States in 1970 were in Gulf waters.
The reasons why so many masters fail to make use of the
fairways are several, but the most obvious is the inconvenience
which they cause.

A brief look at Figure 13 is all that is

needed to see the reason.

A vessel enroute from New Orleans

to Galveston must travel an extra 40 miles if it uses the
existing fairways rather than taking a direct coastal route.
Time is money, and since the danger presented by offshore
oil structures is much less insidious than that of a mine
those masters familiar with their locations will tend to
thread their way through them in order to sborten the trip.
The lack of adequate visual aids to navigation beyond 30 miles
from the coast is another factor which discourages their
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maximum use, even for vessels approaching straight into the
coast.

Unless equipped viith LORAN, it is unlikely that

such a vessel can be navigated with sufficient accuracy to
remain within the

fai~~y

until it gets within visual range

of shore-based aids, buoys, or identifiable oil rigs.
The Coast Guard realized the potential hazard in-the
Gulf at an early date.

In November 1966, at the request of

the Commandant, the Commander, Seventh Coast Guard District
init:ated

i~qujries

concerning the adoption of Sealanes, to

separate opposing traffic streams, in lieu of the established
fairways. The similarity to the dangers inherent in the
.
46
NEMEDRI lanes was cited as the reason for change.
The
proposal, however, was never seriously considered by any of
those, other than the Coast Guard, who had been concerned
with establishing the eXisting system.
Commandant, the

~ll

In a letter to the

requested that such action be deferred

until the existing scheme could be more firmly accepted by
all parties. 47 This appears as recognition on the part of
AMMI that the powerful Gulf oil interests would strongly
resist such a change.

A traffic separation scheme would

restrict oil structures from three times the ocean space
required for fairways.

Apparently

~wcr

was afraid it would

lose what small concessions it had already gained and that
the fairways scheme might not be implemented if it .-uppor-t.ed
the Coast Guard proposal.
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It is doubtful that anything even approachine unanimous
adhere~ce

to this scheme will OCCl~ until the density of

offshore structures is such that masters have no other
choice.

The full import of this classic in poor management

will then be made clear by an upturn in offshore vessel
collisions.

It is difficult to believe that the government

and shipping interests have failed to grasp the lesson

~o

be learned in the North Sea, on the Borkum-Terschelling
NEMEDRI rou-te._
~odern

Sealane Concents.

Major credit for modern efforts

to institute standard vessel routing schemes, particularly
traffic separation schemes, goes to the Institutes of Navigation of Great Britain, France, and the Federal Republic
of Germany.

The Institutes, as a result of a general state-

ment of need contained in the 1960 SOLAS Convention, undertook
a comprehensive stUdy to determine the viability and accept-

ability of traffic separation, particularly in the Strait of
Dover.

This effort has been well documented and needs no

further review here. 48

Suffice to say that it resulted in

the implementation of the first of a series of ]}1CD-arproved
traffic separation schemes on 1 June 1967.

This scheme, which

is depicted in Figure 14, used natural obstacles in the center
of the Strait to separate opposing streams of shipping traffie.
120

FIGURE

14

TRAFFIC SEPARATION SCHEME FOR DOVER STRAIT
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Source: nwo, Ship's Routeing a.nd Traffic Separa.tj.on
Schemes, (London: IMCO, 1971), p. 31.
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Perhaps the most significant aspect of the modern
approach to sealanes, which the Dover Strait scheme typifies,
was the involvement of the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)
of IMCO.

This was the intent of the Institutes of Navigation
-

from the outset; and rightly so.

They wisely realized that

the problem was not confined simply to the Strait of Dover,
nor indeed to the Atlantic Ocean.
viewed on a world-wide basis.

Shipping accidents were

Furthermore, ship traffic in

areas like the -Strait of Dover and the Port of New York
involved ships of practically all maritime nations.

To be

effective, any effort required international cooperation
and IMCO was clearly the instrument by which to achieve it.
Almost concurrently with the work of the Institutes of
Navigation, the U.S. Coast Guard stated its intention to seek
adoption of "Sealanes" .an American wat er-s ,

The first state-

ment of this intent was made in January of 1965, by the
Commandant, in a speech to the Marine Society of New York. 49
This was followed by a series of government-industry studies
in major U.S. ports. 50 The first standard sealane schemes
to be implemented by the United States were at the entrance
to the Port of New York and Delaware Bay.

These conformed

to the standards that had been developed by the Institutes
51
of Navigation and accepted by IMCO.
The New York scheme,
which is shown in Figure 15, was implemented without IMCO
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approval on 1

~~y

1967, one month prior to the scheme in

the Strai -'c of Dover.

It Vias approved by H1CO in lo'larch 1968.

These in.'itial schemes have been folloHed by L12ny oth:.;rs,
all approved by n:co. The total number as of April 1971
was 57. 52 It is "lorthwhile to note that all INCO-approved
schemes have u:o essential

co~mon

features which are:- sep-

aration of opposing streams of vessel traffic; and safe
routing

aro~~d

natural hazards.

Where --!,equireq, llJICO has approved safe routing through
or around

~an-made

hazards, but only where the above mentioned

essential criteria have been met.

Thus, the NEMEDRI routes

and Shipping Safety Fairways in the Gulf of Hexico do not
have !MCO approval and are unlikely to obtain it unless they
are modified.
The Santa Barbara Channel.

It is worth making particular

mention of the coastwise Sealanes which were implemented in
the Santo Barbara Channel in January 1969 by the Coast Guard.
The primary

ptL~ose

of this scheme is the same as that of the

Shipping Safety Fairways, however, wiser heads have prevailed
and the gross mis-management which occurred in the Gulf of
Mexico has not been repeated. 53 As shown in Figure 16, traffic separ27.ion has been incorporated along with the preservation of a structure-free route.
received

Il·iCO

approval.
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The scheme has, accordingly,

FIGURE 16

SEALANE AND SHIPPING SAFETY FAIRWAY SYSTEM
SANTA BARBARA CHANNEL
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Source: IMCO, Ship's Routein~ and Traffic Separation
(London: II1CO, 1971), p. "79.

Schemes.
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These Sealanes did not come about without the same
conflicts between competing interests as occurred in the
Gulf of Mexico.
I

The Coast Guard and shipping interests were

•

strongly in favor of implementation prior to the leasing of
offshore areas for oil

e~~loitation.

The bureaucratic real

estate salesmen of the Department of the Interior (Bureau
of Land Management) and the oilnterests scoffed at concern
for the safety of navigation, and leases were consummated
for offshore lands beneath the proposed sealane areas. 54
This placed the Corps of Engin2ers in the

awk\~ard

position

of having to refuse structure permits to companies which had
already paid high prices for the right to do so.

The Corps

took a much weaker position than it had in the Gulf of Mexico
and disclaimed its author-L ty to deny erection permits until
such time as Sealanes had been officially designated.

A

compromise solution was finally arrived at in which two
major concessions were made by naVigation interests.

These

were to reduce ore way lane width to one mile from two, and
to allow drilling within one half mile of a lane rather than
one mile. 55
It is premature to say that these Sealanes will not be
encroached upon, but the position the naVigation interests
were in was significantly strengthened when they were implemented and approved by

n~co.

There can be no doubt that the

approach taken squarely addresses the oil-shipping conflict
126

at an early stage

~~d

will, therefore, admit of sensible

management.
Proo13T:1 Arees '.'lith niCO Schemes.

The present inter-

national approach to sealanes shows much more thought_with
regard to structure and application than those which have
gone before.

There are several significant factors, how-

ever, which detracted from their overall effectiveness.
At the present time, all vessel routing schemes in
international waters, and most of those within the territorial seas, are voluntary.

Failure of some masters, even

though they are fe·", to adhere to lane discipline while
within a sealane can give rise to very serious collisions.
Aids to navigation are a major concern in establishing
sealanes, particularly in international waters.

It makes

little sense to establish a scheme which is not serviced by
aids which are adequate for the navigation accuracy required
to remain within it.

The lack of adequate aids on the French

side of the Strait of Dover held up traffic separation for
years after agreement had been reached to go forward. 56
Prior to

implementir~

the sealanes leading to the Port of

New York, it was necessary for the U.S. Coast Guard to obtain

stat·~:,ory

authority to establish aids beyond the lindt
of the territorial sea. 57 This problem can be expected to
arise with each new system for which IMCO approval is.requested.
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Since the coastal state is the logical provider of such
service, the problem of who pays becomes important.

Perhaps

it depends upon whether sealanes are regarded as self protective for tl1e coastal states or a service to the ship operators.
At the present time such aids as have been provided have
been established and paid for by the coastal state.

This has

emphasized another problem arva-c--tna t of non-standard buoyage
for sealanes.

For example, buoyage on the French side of the

Str&it of DQver_differs from that on the English side.

Buoy-

age in U.S. waters differs from both of these, and so on from
country to country.

In order to prevent confusion in sea-

lanes, a world-wide standard buoyage system is needed,
particularly for mQrking dangerous sunken

'~ecks

and other

unseen hazards whi.ch may exist in the lanes.
Summary.

The history of the development of sealanes

has been traced through the present system of IMCO-approved
schemes.

The reasons for their need can be seen to fall in

three major categories which are:

(1 ) separation of opposing

traffic streams to prevent collisions; (2) safe routing of
vessels through or around hazardSjand (3) preservation of
routes which are maintained free of man-made hazards.
rany of the older schemes

succe~sfully

addressed the

particular problem for which they were developed.

Some,

either due to a change in vessel traffic patterns or oversight,
128
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have created other situations as hazardous, or more so,
than the danger they were meant to eliminate.
The present

i~orld-wide

system of IMCO-approved sealancs

are structures to address all three of the previously cited
hazards simultaneously.

Some problems remain; mainly those

of enforceability, protection from encroachment, and standard
buoyage.

By and large, this new approach can be

e)~ected

reduce shipping accidents, particularly collisions.

to

Collision

trends over_the four years since the first schemes were implemented show hopeful signs of improvement; however, it is
premature to claim success at this time.
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APPENDIX III

APPENDIX III
GLOSSA.flY

In general, the United States accepts all terminology
which n!CO has adopted relating to vessel routing schemes.
The;:e are certain variations, hovever , ''lhich were approved
for American usage prior to TI1CO's adoption of standard
terminology.

These are used to identify various elements

of vessel routing schemes which are overprinted on navigation
charts produced by the Coast and Geodetic Survey and the U.S.
Navy Oceanographic Office.

Both sets of terms are given

below.
United States TerminologY:
Sealane(s) - A vessel

routip~

scheme which incor-

porates traffic separation and safe routing through congested
or hazardous waters in order to reduce the risk of collision.
Sea lane - A corridor within which all vessel traffic is advised to proceed in the same general direction.

Buffer zone - A zone between opposing sea lanes
which is intended to provide a safe degree of separation
between streams of vessel traffic proceeding in opposite
dil'ections.
Shipping Safety

Fai~1ay

- A corridor in which vessel

traffic moves generally in parallel and opposing directions.
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Normally ir.1plemented as a recommended route for vessels
through offshore oil exploitation areas, or to identify
areas which can be expected to be kept free of oil recovery
platforms.
United Kingdom Terminology:
Clean'rey - A corridor in which vessel traffic moves
generally in parallel and opposing directions.

Normally

implemented as a recommended route for vessels through offshore oil exploitation areas, or to identify areas which can
be expected to be kept free of oil recovery platforms.

Not

expected to be overprinted on navigation charts.

IMCO Terminology:
Routinpa - A complex 0:;: measures concerning routes
followed by ships and aiming at reducing the risk of casualties; it includes traffic separation schemes, fairways,
tracks and deep-draught routes.
Traffic separation scheme - A scheme which aims at
reducing the risk of collision in congested and/or converging
areas by separating traffic.
Traffic lane - .An area \'Ii thin defin:t te limits inside
which all ships are advised to proceed in approximately the
same direction.
Track - A r-ecommended direction of general traffic
flow without definite boundaries or with only one sucn boun''-.--

dary.
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FairNay - An area within defined limits inside
which

two-~Iay

traffic normally may be expected.

Separation zone or line - The zone or line separatip5 traffic proceeding in opposite, or nearly opposite,
directions.
Roundabout - A traffic separation scheme in\vhich
traffic moves in a

counter-cloc~lise

direction around a

specified point or zone.
Inshore traffic

z~

- An area betvleen the landward

boundary of a traffic separation scheme and the adjacent
coast intended for coastal traffic.
Deep-draught route - A route which is primarily

"-

selected for use by ships whicll, because of their draught,
cannot navigate safely outside such route.
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